Iraq, the Nuclear Issue, Aghanistan and the Gulf: The View from Tehran

Selig Harrison, Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, gave a briefing today at the Woodrow Wilson Center where he is also Senior Scholar. Harrison reported on the view from Tehran based on two trips there in the past nine months, most recently in February. His trips were funded by the Trust for Mutual Understanding. Harrison prefaced his remarks with the fact that he went to Iran with the specific objective to see what is possible in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. He was not able to meet one-on-one with either President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but he did meet with many of their key advisors. Most signicanlty, the Iranian Foreign Ministry arranged a meeting with 15 experts that work on Iraq.

Harrison focused most of his remarks on Iran’s view of Iraq beginning with an apropos comment from Mahmoud Vaezi, Deputy of Foreign Policy Research at Center for Strategic Research in Tehran. Vaezi told Harrison, “We have been waiting for this moment since 1639,” meaning that Iran has been waiting for the day when Sunni minority rule would end in Baghdad and Iran would restore its influence.

Harrison said that President Bush clearly did not have the Shi’a connection on his mind when he toppled Sadam Hussein and he pointed to comments by Douglas Feith who has said he believed in 2003 that invading Iraq might speed up the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to Feith, “It was unclear to us how it would all net out and it is still unclear.” He thought that Iranians would be inspired by the “Iraqi revolution.” Feith still calls what’s happening in Iraq a revolution. Paul Wolfowitz was more realistic and believed a Shiite dominated Iraq would never be a puppet of Iran.

But what about an Iraq that is closer to Iran than any other external power? The U.S. was slow to learn that the politicians in power in Iraq have had close ties to Iran.

Harrison thinks it’s obvious the U.S. has embarked on a new military strategy in Sadr City. Iran has carefully avoided playing favorites in Iraq, but the U.S. has not. Harrison said he has heard Iranian anger over the U.S. role in Sadr City and said the timing of the escalation in Hizbollah attacks in Lebanon might be linked to the U.S. decision to step up military action against the Mahdi army. Harrison also said the Iranian suspension of a fourth round of talks with the U.S. over Iraqi security is also a result of situation in Sadr City. Many Iranians asked Harrison, “How can the U.S. accuse us of interfering in Iraq?”

The U.S. has to give serious attention to Iran’s view of what must be done in Iraq. There can be no graceful withdrawal from Iraq without Iranian cooperation. Iran wants a stable Iraq, what they define as a “friendly Iraq.” Their effort is to keep a hand in with all actors so they end up with friends in power. Harrison said the importance of Iran-Iraq war can not be overemphasized enough as the basic context for Iran’s view of the situation in Iraq and in context of the nuclear issue.

Iran is ready to cooperate in stabilizing Iraq, but only if U.S. is willing to set a timetable for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq. In return for stabilizing Iraq, the basic U.S. quid pro quo would be accepting Iran’s right to be a major player in Iraq. Acceptance by Saudi Arabia is also implicit.

Iran has carefully avoided taking sides in current Shiite internal struggle and wants the U.S. to do the same. It has also attempted to keep on good terms with all Shia factions. They do prefer al-Hakim as the preeminent force in the Shi’a community in Iraq, but they are being careful to keep their Revolutionary Guard relationships with Muqtada al-Sadr. Essentially, they are hedging their bets in Iraq. It is important to stop the slaughter in Sadr City because it puts Iran in an awkward position, particularly as it has been restraining Muqtada al-Sadr, so far, something Harrison was repeatedly told. It is pretty clear that the March 2008 truce was brokered by an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp general. A Shiastan in the South is also a very important question.

The safest way to predict what would come out of any Modus Vivendi between the U.S. and Iran over Iraq is when withdrawal is completed. But, according to Harrison, in a Modus Vivendi, Iran would pledge not to give missiles capable of hitting green zone. It would end aid to militias in Iraq when U.S. forces are withdrawn and it would help with eliminating al Qaeda in Iraq. Iranians also focus on security guarantees that U.S. bases in Iraq will not be used to attack Iran. Iran also does not want an independent Kurdistan. For a graceful U.S. withdrawal, Iran expects the U.S. to end aide to Party for a Fee Live in Kurdistan (PJAK) and other groups, in particular separatist groups in Balouchistan.

Two Iranian demands would be particularly difficult to get through U.S. policy process. Iran wants the U.S. to end support for Mujahideen al Khalq (MEK) fighters who have been kept at Camp Ahsraf in Iraq for the last five years. Iran wants the U.S. to put MEK fighters through a Red Cross screening process so they can return to Iran.

Iranians are very angry now about what they see as a shift in U.S. policy since the 2005 Iraqi elections. In their perception, they see the Sunni Awakening as an abandonment of support for a Shiite dominated Iraq that resulted from the 2005 elections. Iran wants the U.S. to stop building up Sunni militias, but it is not going to be easy to roll back the Sunni Awakening. As Steven Simon points out “The Price of the Surge” the U.S. made deals “mediated by tribal leaders and consisted of payments of $360 per month per combatant in exchange for allegiance and cooperation… The total number [of combatants] across Iraq is estimated at over 90,000… The Sunni sheiks, meanwhile, are getting rich from the surge. The United States has budgeted $150 million to pay Sunni tribal groups this year, and the sheiks take as much as 20 percent of every payment to a former insurgent -- which means that commanding 200 fighters can be worth well over a hundred thousand dollars a year for a tribal chief.”

The U.S. has started something that will be difficult to stop. Ending the Sunni Awakening is important to re-establishing stability. As George Packer pointed out in an article for the New Yorker, Sunni awakening policy is seen as indicative of the long-range goals of the U.S. in Iraq.

But, what will happen to the Sunnis? They will have to accept rule by the Shiite majority, just as Shiites had to accept Sunni rule for the last five centuries. President Bush assigned the Sunnis to this status when he overthrew Saddam Hussein.

For this reason, a U.S.-Iran agreement must be accompanied by a broader regional agreement. Iran is ready for a regional approach. The U.S. media has given little attention to Iran’s efforts to work on regional cooperation.

Regarding Iranian views of cooperation over Afghanistan, Harrison said his best meeting was with Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of Majlis, who like many other Iranians, said that Iran cooperated with the U.S. to defeat the Taliban after the September 11, 2001 attacks. “Our reward was membership in the Axis of Evil,” Boroujerdi said. Harrison said there is a tremendous feeling of unreciprocated overtures in Iran.

Iranians still believe there are areas for serious cooperation with the U.S. over Afghanistan, particularly with halting narcotics trafficking. Iranians dismissed U.S. claims their helping the Taliban and completely are with U.S. in opposing them. Harrison said it is interesting to note that U.S. accusations on this have died down.

Regarding the Gulf, Harrison said the Iranians have a very pragmatic attitude. No one expects the U.S. to completely withdraw militarily from the gulf. But the carriers represent the biggest threat, especially as they are equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. Removal of carriers from the Gulf would be Iran’s first demand.

Harrison said there was a good reception in Iran for the idea of a reduction of U.S. military presence in the Gulf as proposed by Kenneth Pollack from Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. Pollack argues, “The best way for the United States to address the rise of terrorism and the threat of internal instability in Saudi Arabia and the other [Gulf Cooperation Council] states would be to reduce its military presence in the region to the absolute minimum, or even to withdraw entirely.” The Navy could remain in Bahrain, but there must be fewer American warships. Harrison notes the difficulty comes with Iran’s desires for expansion.

Harrison said the U.S. media portrays Iran as trouble-maker in the Gulf. However, since King Abdullah came to power in Saudi Arabia and since Rafsanjani’s haj when he was president, there has been a marked Saudi-Iran bi-polar balance. Saudi-Iranian political tensions can be serious, but that does not mean that Saudi Arabia is willing to engage militarily.

Finally, regarding the nuclear program, Harrison said the U.S. is not serious about a negotiated settlement otherwise it would not be insisting on suspension of uranium enrichment as a precondition. He noted that nuclear negotiations between Iran and the European Union in 2004-05 were based on a bargain that the EU failed to honor. Iran did suspend enrichment efforts for more than half a year. The EU promised to put forward security guarantees and economic incentives, but it could not produce the security guarantees. Many Iranians, including former Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Javad Zarif, put their reputations on the line to convince the powers in Iran to suspend and the U.S. was unwilling to cooperate on security assurances. All factions in Iran agree that they should not be conned again.

Is a nuclear settlement possible? Harrison argues that given a settlement in Iraq, it would be possible to get a freeze at some point in future negotiations under International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. But reciprocity would be required and the U.S. would have to make a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against Iran. Harrison believes establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone agreement in the Persian Gulf should be part of the settlement. He said no one in Tehran talked about a security agreement extending beyond the Gulf into the Middle East. He said the U.S. could rule out using nuclear weapons in gulf without doing so in the Middle East and this would not hurt its policy on Israel.

LA Times Interviews Mohsen Hakim on Iran's Role in Iraq

Los Angeles Times reporter Ramin Mostaghim interviewed Mohsen Hakim, son of leader of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) Abdelaziz Hakim, in Tehran on May 3, 2008. The whole interview is transcribed on the Los Angeles Times blog on Middle East issues, “Babylon and Beyond.” Below are key excerpts from the interview regarding Iran’s role in Iraq.

LAT: Do you believe the recent increasing accusations against Iran by the U.S. are a prelude for a U.S. attack to Iran?

HAKIM: Look, the disputes between Iran and U.S. are not new. In fact, they are 30 years old, unfortunately. We see the signs of these kinds of disputes in Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. Even some other places in the world.

LAT: You mean they are fighting proxy wars in those places?

HAKIM: I do not know. For us, as the citizens of Iraq, we only care about our elected, legal and legitimate government in Iraq. Whatever the government in Iraq says is valid for us. There is no doubt that between Iraq and neighboring countries there were some disputes dating back to the time of Saddam. These disputes are financial debts, territorial disputes, economic disagreements and some of these problems popped up in the aftermath of Saddam's collapse. The disputes between Iraq and other countries should be managed the way crises are managed and engineered so that the security of Iraq is not jeopardized.

LAT: How much influence does Iran have on the Mahdi Army?

HAKIM: In fact, I do not how influential Iran is. Yes, we can feel that Iran, given the deep relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran with other groups in Iraq… I can say Iran has effective influences among all ethnic, religious and political factions, even among Sunni Arabs in Iraq. You can see the influences by tracing the trips of leaders from different factions to Iran. Iran's relations with Iraq is very complicated. It has religious, political, historic and civilizational aspects. The holy sites and all the top sources of emulation are connected to Iran, and it is not limited to one group or army. Bear in mind, from Qaradagh Valley in [the northernmost] Iraqi Kurdistan until estuary or mouth of Faw Peninsula [in southern Iraq], there is an 1,336-kilometer [800-mile] border with Iran.

LAT: So Iran effectively has relations with all factions in Iraq?

HAKIM: Yes with Kurds, Shiites and others."

LAT: Does SIIC worry about the close ties between Iran and the Mahdi Army led by Moqtada Sadr?

HAKIM: Look, if you mean Moqtada Sadr, it is one thing. The Mahdi Army is different. The Mahdi Army is a military faction, but Moqtada Sadr has a political faction and without a doubt the Islamic Republic of Iran has good relations with Moqtada Sadr and his political faction. And we are not worried about that relationship of the political faction of Mr. Sadr with Iran. The government of Iraq should comment on that if there is a worry about that or not. So far the government of Maliki has not said so."

LAT: What is the relationship between Iran and SIIC right now? How much access do you have to authorities and to whom?

HAKIM: We have developed good relationship with all factions. But all official contacts are through our embassy here. I can say our relations with the civil society of Iran and political factions, parties, academic and research centers are strong. Our office here is more in contact with the Iraqi grass roots, refugees and repatriated Iranians who were deported in the late 1960s and early 1970s to Iran."

LAT: Are the Hakims worried about a war between the U.S. and Iran?

HAKIM: In my opinion, all over the region, in fact, there is a worry about tensions between Iran and U.S. You can call it tension, crisis or war, whatever. Everybody in the region is worried. It is not important what you call it. The tension is most dangerous for Iraq. Not war, this very tension, if it continues, not war, is very bad for Iraq. If you remember, Mr. Abdelaziz Hakim was the first person to call for direct talks between Iran and U.S. over Iraqi security issue."

Time for a Diplomatic Surge

The Bush administration seems to have placed the symbolic mantle of Enemy No. 1 on Iran’s shoulders, displacing al Qaeda from that position. But although the administration and various pundits paint a good guys-bad guys narrative to sell conflict to the American people, reality is far more muddled. Rather than demonizing Iran, the United States should focus on a diplomatic surge that includes direct, comprehensive, and unconditional talks not only on Iraq, but also on the range of outstanding issues between the two countries. What the Bush administration refuses to acknowledge is that when it comes to Iraq, U.S. and Iranian interests converge.

Click here to read the full article, "Time for a Diplomatic Surge," by Carah Ong, Right Web Analysis (Somerville, MA: Political Research Associates, April 29, 2008).

The Inconvenient Truth About U.S.-Iran Shared Interests in Iraq

In a new opinion article for Salon.com, Gary Kamiya interviews Juan Cole and Gregory Gause (who testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 3) for their response to the Petraeus-Crocker/Bush Administration claims on Iran’s role in Iraq.

“In short, the truth about Iraq, which the Bush administration has withheld from the American people, is that Iran and the United States have an alliance of convenience in Iraq. Both support ISCI and Maliki. Iran does give limited support to the nationalist firebrand Sadr, but the significance of that pales in comparison to the two countries' shared interests. The Bush administration has concealed that inconvenient truth and pushed its good guys-bad guys narrative on the American people because that narrative is needed to sell the war.

“In a larger sense, both Cole and Gause said it would make no sense for the Iranians to try to destabilize the Maliki regime…In short, Iran wants the status quo -- which is pretty much what the United States wants, too. So why shouldn't the U.S. just work out the most harmonious way of achieving that goal by talking to the Iranians? That, in fact, is just what Gause argued the United States should do in his testimony before Congress. But the Bush administration, in thrall to its neoconservative ideology, will never conduct serious negotiations with Iran. Indeed, it seems to be too ideologically blinkered, or incompetent, even to realize that Iran and the United States have a significant shared interest in Iraq.”

Read the full article for more about claims and recent events in Iraq.

Iran in the Petraeus-Crocker hearings

As expected, Iran received a significant amount of attention at the Petraeus-Crocker hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) yesterday.

In his report to the committees, General David H. Petraeus focused much of the blame for failure in Iraq on Iran. Here are specific claims against Iran from Petraeus’ report:

“Though a Sadr standdown order resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called Special Groups and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the Special Groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.” (page 1)

“Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging way, through its lethal support to the Special Groups.” (page 2)

“Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also focused on the Special Groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed by Iran’s Qods Force, with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq’s seat of government two weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and Coalition actions in response. Iraqi and Coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmedinajad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the Special Groups. However, nefarious activities by the Qods Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq. We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq.” (page 4)

“External actors, like Iran, could stoke violence within Iraq, and actions by other neighbors could undermine the security situation as well.” (page 5)

“The strategic considerations include recognition that…a failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against Al Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the effort to counter malign Iranian influence.” (page 6)

“It clearly is in our national interest to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of Al Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over Iraq’s borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies.” (page 6)

Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker also pointed the proverbial finger at Iran. Here are some of his statements:

“A wildcard remains the Sadrist Trend – and whether the Iraqis can continue to drive a wedge between other elements of the Trend and Iranian-supported Special Groups.” (page 6)

“Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi government to establish a stable, secure state through the authority and training of criminal militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran’s malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when militia elements armed and trained by Iran clashed with Iraqi government forces in Basrah and Baghdad. When the President announced the Surge, he pledged to seek out and destroy Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq. We know more about these networks and their Quds Force sponsors than ever before – and we will continue to aggressively uproot and destroy them. At the same time, we support constructive relations between Iran and Iraq and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make.” (page 12-13)

“And it is not only Al-Qa’ida that would benefit [from a major U.S. departure] -- Iran has said publicly it will fill any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shi’a militias would reassert themselves. We saw them try in Basrah and Baghdad two weeks ago. And in all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on a scale far beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict could draw in neighbors with devastating consequences for the region and the world.” (page 14)

During the question and answer session in SASC, Senators Martinez, Lieberman, Graham also focused their line of questioning on blaming Iran for the events in Basra. Senator Jack Reed pointed out that Iranians are actually supporting all of the various Shi’a groups in Iraq, including the government.

In the SFRC hearing, Ambassador Crocker claimed U.S. has conducted a “diplomatic surge.” Senator Chuck Hagel retorted that such claims are thin and a real diplomatic surge would involve Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates or a special envoy reaching out to Iraq’s neighbors to talk not just about Iraq, but also a range of regional issues.

And, of course, one of the other highlights was Senator John McCain once again confusing Sunni and Shi’a.

Iran to Announce Progress on National Day of Nuclear Technology

According to the Tehran Times, Iranian government spokesman Gholam-Hossein Elham told reporters in a news conference that the country will announce progress on the nuclear program on April 8, Iran's national day of nuclear technology, which coincides with the break of official relations between Iran and the United States in 1979. On April 4, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rejected any new package of incentives from the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council and Germany in exchange for suspending enrichment.

At the same news conference, Elham strongly dismissed reports that the Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is in Iran. However, Associated Press correspondent Ali Akbar Dareini writes that an Iranian governtment official who deals with Iraq confirmed on April 5 that his government helped end the clashes between Iraqi government troops and al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia for the sake of Shiite unity. An Iraqi official also confirmed Iran's role saying, "Iran played a mediating role and helped ease things a lot. Given its influence over al-Sadr, Iran convinced the Sadrists to stop fighting."

Iran's Role in Iraq Discussed During SFRC Hearing

Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not yet held any hearings specifically on Iran yet this year, Iran’s role in Iraq came up in an SFRC hearing on April 2 entitled, “IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: POLITICAL PROSPECTS” as part of series of hearings being held in preparation for hearings next week with General David Petreaus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker on the surge’s progress. During the hearing, Chairman Joseph Biden questioned what the surge has accomplished and stressed the need for a new approach. He said, “I just think that we need a diplomatic surge, we need to engage major - other major powers, Iraq's neighbors and the UN in the search for a solution which this administration has utterly neglected.”

In an article for Middle East Online today, several analysts argued that the U.S. is stuck in rut trying isolate Iran instead of engaging the country. Suzanne Maloney, a former Bush administration official from the State Department and now a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution said: "There is a pragmatic strategic interest on the part of the US in engaging with the Iranians because they are an inevitable part of both the problem and the solution in Iraq.” She also said that “although the United States has had intermittent low-level talks with Iran, it missed a chance to fully engage with Tehran when its supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei made an unprecedented call for talks in 2006. The United States at the time was focused on rallying the international community into isolating Iran over its disputed nuclear program.” She also “suspects Iran will now just wait for the next US administration to consider any move toward real dialogue.”

Michael Ware and Nir Rosen Discuss Iran's Role in Iraq

On April 2, the Center for American Progress hosted an event with Michael Ware and Nir Rosen entitled “A View from the Ground in Iraq.” While most of the session focused on Iraq, Iran naturally came up in the discussions. In his opening remarks on where Iraq is five years later, Rosen commented “People think there are two occupations now: the Americans and Iran. (Sunni racism leads them to designate all Shia as Iranian, and not “real Arabs.”) People in Iraq think Americans will leave, but Iranians—meaning the Iraqi government, the Shias they defeated and expelled but now are back because the Americans let them in through the back door—are there to stay.”

When asked specifically about Iran’s role, Ware said:

“The big winner of the last 6 years is Iran. The former Iraqi government was blown away, with a vacuum left behind. Iran was best placed to capitalize on that vacuum. Nir is right: there is no such thing as an Iraqi government; it’s a loose, rainbow alliance of separate factions. Key components in the so-called ‘ally’ Iraqi government were either formed in Iran or getting help from Iran.

“The Kurds have their own government; there are essentially two governments in Iraq. Even the PUK leader in the Iraqi government has a well-developed relationship with Iran. The president of the Kurds is seen with caution because of his ties with Iran.

“Iran has a legitimate national strategic interest in Iraq. Iraqi leaders are told they have some choices to make. Iran tells them they are a regional superpower, they will be a nuclear power, and unlike Iraq’s American friends, they are never leaving.

“Dealing with Iran’s influence has caused fractures in America’s Arab alliance. A byproduct has been the Sunni Awakening Movement. They hate Iranians and are willing to fight them. They used to fight with al-Qaeda against us, and now they fight with us against al-Qaeda. Really, they are being used as a stick to beat the Iraqi government. They are anti-government forces. The Iraqi government is their number 1 enemy when America is not around to censor what they say. When asked what they’ll do after America leaves, they say they’ll keep their weapons, and then the real fight begins.”

Gareth Porter also posed the question “If the US is seriously interested in political reconciliation, wouldn’t it be more interested in aligning with al-Sadr, given that he’s a nationalist and can reach out the Sunnis?”

Ware responded, “Muqtada, from the American perspective is up for grabs at some point. He is no friend of Iran; he is an Iraqi nationalist. He has been forced into relations with Iran, but he does not toe the line. The Iranians put pressure on the Dawa party to cause factions, which suits them. I think that’s what we’re seeing here. Al-Sadr serves American and Iranian interests, but I think America may have missed the boat on this one. My fear is that the Sunni-Shia divide will not be erased for a long time to come. Most Iraqis do not bear this in their hearts, but political events in the recent past have forced this upon them.”

Rosen added, “Muqtada, being in Iran, is losing credibility among his supporters.”

Peter Galbraith on the Iran-Iraq Dynamic

Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Senior Diplomatic Fellow Peter Galbraith’s latest article – “The Victor?” – is now available on the Center’s website.

The essay will appear in the Oct. 11, 2007 issue of the New York Review of Books and reviews Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States by Trita Parsi (Yale University Press).

Here are Galbraith’s culminant remarks on the Iran-Iraq dynamic and the Bush administration's accusations of Iranian meddling in Iraq:

"U.S. pre-war intelligence on Iraq was horrifically wrong on the key question of Iraq's possession of WMDs, and President Bush ignored the intelligence to assert falsely a connection between Saddam Hussein and September 11. This alone is sufficient reason to be skeptical of the Bush administration's statements on Iran.

"Some of the administration's charges against Iran defy common sense. In his Reno speech, President Bush accused Iran of arming the Taliban in Afghanistan while his administration has, at various times, accused Iran of giving weapons to both Sunni and Shiite insurgents in Iraq. The Taliban are Salafi jihadis, Sunni fundamentalists who consider Shiites apostates deserving of death. In power, the Taliban brutally repressed Afghanistan's Shiites and nearly provoked a war with Iran when they murdered Iranian diplomats inside the Iranian consulate in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Iraq's Sunni insurgents are either Salafi jihadis or Baathists, the political party that started the Iran-Iraq War.

"The Iranian regime may believe it has a strategic interest in keeping U.S. forces tied down in the Iraqi quagmire since this, in the Iranian view, makes an attack on Iran unlikely. U.S. clashes with the Mahdi Army complicate the American military effort in Iraq and it is plausible that Iran might provide some weapons - including armor-penetrating IEDs - to the Mahdi Army and its splinter factions. Overall, however, Iran has no interest in the success of the Mahdi Army. Moqtada al-Sadr has made Iraqi nationalism his political platform. He has attacked the SIIC for its pro-Iranian leanings and challenged Iraq's most important religious figure, Ayatollah Sistani, himself an Iranian citizen. Asked about charges that Iran was organizing Iraqi insurgents, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told the Financial Times on May 10, "The whole idea is unreasonable. Why should we do that? Why should we undermine a government in Iraq that we support more than anybody else?"

"The United States cannot now undo President Bush's strategic gift to Iran. But importantly, the most pro-Iranian Shiite political party is the one least hostile to the United States. In the battle now underway between the SIIC and Moqtada al-Sadr for control of southern Iraq and of the central government in Baghdad, the United States and Iran are on the same side. The U.S. has good reason to worry about Iran's activities in Iraq. But contrary to the Bush administration's allegations - supported by both General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker in their recent congressional testimony - Iran does not oppose Iraq's new political order. In fact, Iran is the major beneficiary of the American-induced changes in Iraq since 2003."

US Will Establish Military Base at Iran-Iraq Border

The Wall Street Journal reported today that the US is planning to build its first base near the Iraq-Iran border. According to the WSJ article, the move is part of “a new effort to curb the flow of advanced Iranian weaponry to Shiite militants across Iraq. The push also includes construction of fortified checkpoints on the major highways leading from the Iranian border to Baghdad and the installation of X-ray machines and explosives-detecting sensors at the only formal border crossing between Iran and Iraq.”

The article also cites US officers who say they plan to use the new base for at least two years, though it is unclear whether the base will be among the small number of facilities that would remain in Iraq after any future large-scale US withdrawal from the country.

According to the article, “Maj. Toby Logsdon, the US officer overseeing the project, says that the new base will have living quarters for at least 200 soldiers. He hopes US forces will begin living at the new outpost in November.”

The move comes as US has ratcheted up accusations that Iran is supplying Shiite militias with arms and training, though it has not provided any substantiated evidence for those claims.

Modified Lieberman Amendment

Here is the modified version of the Lieberman (I-CT), McCain, Kly, Graham, Coleman, Collins, Sessions, Levin, Salazar and Craig amendment No. 2073 to the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, which passed 97-0 on July 11. As noted before, the amendment accuses Iran of assisting forces in Iraq that are contributing to the destabilization of Iraq and the murders of Americans, demanding that Iran cease those activities and requiring the Administration to report to Congress concerning Iran's activities there and responses to those activities. Most notably, the changed version closed with the sentence: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of Armed Forces against Iran.”

Other modifications include requiring input of the Director of National Intelligence in producing reports; issuing the overdue National Intelligence Estimate on Iran (there hasn’t been one for more than 18 months, but rumor has it, one may be produced before the August recess); and supporting diplomacy to stop threats against the US.

Senator Levin insisted on striking the words “of hostility” from the following “Sense of Congress passage”: “the murder of members of the United States armed forces by a foreign government or its agents is an intolerable and unacceptable act of hostility against the United States.”

The amendment had the full support of the Senate and not a single Senator challenged any of the allegations presented in the resolution.

Click here for the original version of the amendment. Click here for the Bush administration’s Statement of Policy on amendments to the Defense Authorization Bill.

US Escalates Pressure on Iran

Yesterday, the US escalated allegations regarding Iranian involvement in Iraq claiming that its Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (also known as Revolutionary Guards or IRGC) and its covert unit the Qods force played a role in an attack that killed five Americans and was using Lebanese militants to train Iraqi insurgents. Previous allegations have been off the record. Army Brigadier General Kevin Bergner conducted the public briefing.

In response, Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) reiterated the need to keep open the possibility of using military force against Iran, but stopped short of advocating an immediate military strike.

UPDATE:
For criticism of the New York Times reporting of the press conference with Gen. Bergner, read Greg Mitchell's article in Editor and Publisher entitled "Consider the Source: NYT Reporter Targets Iran."