Brownback Amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill

On September 30, Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced an amendment on Iran (No. 5360) to the Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. The amendment would require the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report, in both classified and unclassified forms, on Iran's current and future military strategy. Below is the full text of the amendment.

SA 5360. Mr. BROWNBACK submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 3001, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1233. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY POWER OF IRAN.

(a) Annual Report Required.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than March 1 each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the current and future military and security strategy of Iran.

(2) GENERAL SCOPE OF REPORTS.--Each report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the Iran military and the tenets and probable development of the grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, and of military organizations and operational concepts, of Iran during the 20-year period beginning on the date of such report.

(3) FORM.--Each report shall be submitted in both unclassified and classified form.

(b) Elements.--Each report under this section shall include analyses and forecasts with respect to the following:

(1) The goals of the grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy of Iran during the 20-year period beginning on the date of such report, and the relationship between such strategies and the current security situation in the Middle East and Central and South Asia.

(2) The size, location, and capabilities of the land, sea, air, and irregular forces of Iran, including the Artesh, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Lebanese Hezbollah, and any other force controlled by the Iran or receiving funds or training from the Iran.

(3) Developments in and the capabilities of the ballistic missile, nuclear, and chemical and biological weapons programs of Iran.

(4) The degree to which Iran depends on unconventional, irregular, or asymmetric capabilities to achieve its strategic goals.

(5) The irregular warfare capabilities of Iran, including the exploitation of asymmetric strategies and related weapons and technology, the use of covert forces, the use of proxy forces, support for terrorist organizations, and strategic communications efforts.

(6) Efforts by Iran to develop, acquire, or gain access to information, communication, nuclear, and other advanced technologies that would enhance its military capabilities.

(7) The nature and significance of any arms, munitions, military equipment, or military or dual-use technology acquired by Iran from outside Iran, including from a foreign government or terrorist organization, or provided by Iran to any foreign government or terrorist organization.

(8) The nature and significance of any bilateral or multilateral security or defense-related cooperation agreements, whether formal or informal, between Iran and any foreign government or terrorist organization.

(9) Expenditures by Iran on each of the following:

(A) The security forces of Iran, whether regular and irregular, including the Artesh, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

(B) The programs of Iran relating to weapons of mass destruction.

(C) Support provided to terrorist groups, insurgent groups, irregular proxy forces, and related activities.

(D) Bilateral military aid.

(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--

(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.

Global Pulse on Missiles and Diplomacy

Is Iran Currently an Existential Threat to the United States?

In a new analysis released today comparing the conventional military capabilities of the United States and Iran, experts at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation conclude that the current threat posed by Iran is exaggerated by conflating it with Iran's potential, but far from certain, acquisition of a nuclear weapon in the future.

The side-by-side comparison is available online.

"It is dangerous to allow speculation about what Iran might be able to do in the future to permeate debates about the threat posed by Iran today," said Carah Ong, Iran Policy Analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "Conflating future and present threats creates an artificial sense of urgency about what the United States must do to protect itself."

Iran currently presents a number of serious problems for the United States. Iran could attack U.S. forces in Iraq or use its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah to attack Israel. However, by nearly every quantifiable metric, Iran does not presently represent an existential threat to the United States based on its conventional arsenal.

The United States will spend 99 times more on defense than Iran in the upcoming fiscal year. U.S. fighter aircraft outnumber Iranian aircraft 12.4 to 1, and American planes like the F-22 Raptor are far superior to aging Iranian aircraft.

In fact, out of 24 categories included in the comparison, Iran only possesses an advantage over the United States in two: artillery units and patrol and coastal combatant ships. These two advantages, however, would be meaningless in any imaginable conflict scenario.

"A comparison of the United States and Iran's conventional military capabilities demonstrates the overwhelming superiority of the United States," noted John Isaacs, Executive Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "People need to spend less time hyperventilating about the rhetoric of two unpopular leaders and more time using realistic assessments to formulate smart policies."

A nuclear weapon in the hands of Iran would be dangerous, and the United States must take steps to prevent this development. However, direct diplomatic engagement with Iran on the nuclear issue, without preconditions, is one method that the Bush administration has yet to try.

As the comparison makes clear, the United States would be engaging from a position of strength. A recent Gallup poll showed that 59 percent of Americans believe it would be a good idea for the President of the United States to meet with the President of Iran.

"Pursuing diplomacy with Iran is not going to be easy, and it will not resolve all of the outstanding issues overnight," concluded Ong. "But it is an approach that is worth trying, particularly given the disastrous consequences that would result from a military confrontation between the United States and Iran."

The side-by-side comparison is available online.

Iran to Buy Fighters Based on Israeli Technology

Ha’aretz is running article today regarding a new deal between Iran and China under which Iran will buy two squadrons of J-10 fighter planes that are based on Israeli technology. According to the article, “The 24 aircraft are based on technology and components provided to China by Israel following the cancellation of the Lavi project in the mid-1980s. The engines of the J-10 are Russian-made. The total cost of the planes is estimated at $1 billion, and deliveries are expected between 2008 and 2010. The estimated operational range of the aircraft, with external fuel tanks, is 3,000 kilometers, which means Israel falls within their radius of operation.”

The transaction would provide an expansion to Iran’s current aging fleet ofpredominantly US equipment (F-14s and F-5s).

Iran also announced in August this year that it is developing a "new" Azarakhsh (Lightning) close-air-support fighter. The Azarakhsh “is simply an enlarged F-5 with a second vertical stabilizer and marginally better avionics. Various intel assessments indicate that Iran has about 50 F-5s left in its inventory; there are no indications as to how many of those airframes may be re-built as 'Lightnings.'"