ElBaradei Calls for Diplomacy with Iran

Juan Cole published the following document on his Informed Comment blog on Friday, November 30. I have excerpted the relevant Iran quotes below.

'Argentina: IAEA Head Warns Against Using Force Against Iran"Exclusive" interview with Mohamed ElBaradei, International Atomic Energy Agency head, by Nestor Restivo in Buenos Aires on 28 November: "To use force against Iran could lead it to having atomic weapons." First paragraph is Clarin's introduction. Passages within slantlines are published in boldfaceClarin (Internet Version-WWW)
Thursday, November 29, 2007
Document Type: OSC Translated Text

(Nestor Restivo) /Washington was highly critical of you and of UN inspector Hans Blix when you both denied that Saddam Husayn had weapons of mass destruction. Then the United States invaded Iraq. Is this is a similar scenario?/

(Mohamed ElBaradei) In both cases it is our duty to work with objectivity. I hope that there is no parallel (between these two cases) and that we have all learned a lesson. Despite all of our differences, I do believe that everyone sees a single solution for Iran: diplomacy.

(Restivo) /But you know that the military option is on the table.../

(ElBaradei) That would not solve anything. On the contrary, it would delay the Iranian plan but in the end it would not produce a lasting solution and would generate more problems in a region that is already a huge mess, the Middle East. There is no 100 percent guarantee, but we also do not have data indicating to us that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. But we do need an additional protocol about its new facilities.

(Restivo) /Is it helpful for the United States or Israel to be talking about a military option? Why would Iran allow more inspections if they (the facilities inspected) might eventually become military targets?/

(ElBaradei) Diplomacy has more to do with pressures, sanctions, and incentives for good behavior than with force. It used to be said that diplomacy was war waged by other means, but that ended with the UN Charter, which only allows war for self-defense, in the case of an imminent threat, or if the Security Council approves it. The use of force would put pressure on Iran to manufacture nuclear weapons, while right now it does not have large industrial facilities in operation. What Iran has is a nascent and small nuclear enrichment plan. But when a country is threatened it generally ends up with a military system.

(Restivo) /Will there be more in-depth inspections in Iran?/

(ElBaradei) Yes, of course. Iran is a very complex case. For 20 years it developed a secret program and that made the IAEA's work very difficult, as we said in our report. I have insisted that they act with the utmost transparency and cooperation as there has been a loss of confidence in the nature of the program. And that is the key: the crisis of confidence. The most sensitive issue is uranium enrichment, for with enriched uranium it is possible to produce nuclear materials.

(Restivo) /Is Mahmud Ahmadinezhad's government on that course?/

(ElBaradei) We have not found that to be so, but we do not have a 100 percent guarantee. The fact that Iran is working actively on enrichment shows that they do have a program, but they do not have an urgent need as they still do not have a nuclear product. Of course the Iranians say that they should be self-sufficient and independent, that this is a scientific and civilian issue, a matter of technological development, and that this is for exports that could benefit them in the future. But if the IAEA cannot conduct inspections of Iran and prove that all of this is intended for peaceful uses, the crisis of confidence will continue. Nobody is questioning Iran's right. The problem is the timing (previous word in English) for exercising that right.

(Restivo) /What role is the Security Council playing in this? Neither China nor Russia will agree to new sanctions against Iran.../

(ElBaradei) The Security Council has asked Iran to suspend its enrichment program until confidence has been restored. And I have done the same. The more they cooperate and allow us access to documentation and other things, the more we will be able to rebuild confidence. We need what is known as the Additional Protocol, which would give us additional information and access to new sites. This is essential so that we can not only look at the past but also say that "we are now in a position to provide guarantees about the current projects." The Security Council should ask and apply pressure on Iran in order to get it to agree to negotiate and to make it realize that a permanent solution will only come through negotiations.

(Restivo) /Do you have confidence that this will happen?/

(ElBaradei) Yes, tomorrow negotiators from Iran and the European Union are meeting and I am optimistic. The nuclear issue has been a troublesome matter between the West and Iran for 50 years, since the fall of the elected government in Iran in 1953 until now. And not only the West and Iran should be involved in this dialogue, but other countries as well, countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine. The sooner some agreement is reached, the sooner we will see prospects for an ideal solution.

(Restivo) /Some US officials like Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice have taken a very tough stance toward you. How do you handle those pressures?/

(ElBaradei) The IAEA's function and its reports are highly technical. But we are also a multinational agency. And diplomacy and multilateralism are two sides of the same coin, so in addition to technical matters I also make use of diplomacy, I try to convince, argue, apply pressure, and use persuasion. Of course, my diplomacy is limited to dialogue, as there is no army behind it. I am indeed the target of pressures, but as long as you know that you have your feet on the ground and are sure of what you are doing, pressures are like Teflon; they do not stick. Moreover, I have gotten used to this, as we have been criticized by Saddam, by Korea, and now by Israel. We deal with extremely sensitive issues and we have to be very careful that we are not pushed in any direction. Everyone listens to us with great attention. This does seem rather schizophrenic, doesn't it? Governments hire us, but at times we make a judgment about them and it is difficult for them to accept the fact that, even though they are paying us, we can still judge them.

IAEA Releases Report on Iran

The Institute for Science and International Security has posted the new International Atomic Energy Agency report on Iran on its website. Keep in mind the United Nations Security Council has been waiting for this report to determine how to proceed on a new round of sanctions on Iran. When I have a chance to review more closely, I'll post more analysis.

Shift in the IAEA Board of Governors

A shift in the make-up of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors on September 20 could make it easier for the United States to make its case on Iran to the IAEA Board. US allies Saudi Arabia, Ireland and Philippines were among the 11 countries named as incoming members, while both Syria and Cuba were among the outgoing states. Cuba has been vocal in condemning Western states for criticizing the most recent IAEA agreement with Iran on outstanding issues regarding its nuclear program.

The changes are part of a regular rotation of Board members. The members for 2007-2008 are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russian, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. It should be noted that Britain, China, France, Russia and the US are permanent members of the IAEA Board of Governors. They are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the five so-called “declared” nuclear weapons states.

New IAEA Report on Iran

On August 30, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General ElBaradei also delivered his report on the Implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards in Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors. The assessment states that Iran is now simultaneously operating nearly 2,000 centrifuges, the fast-spinning machines that produce enriched uranium, at its vast underground facilityat Natanz, an increase of several hundred machines from three months ago. More than 650 more centrifuges are being tested or are under construction. That number is far short of Iran's projection that by now it would be running 3,000 of the machines.

Mohamed ElBaradei said in an hour-long interview: "This is the first time Iran is ready to discuss all the outstanding issues which triggered the crisis in confidence. It's a significant step. There are clear deadlines, so it's not, as some people are saying, an open-ended invitation to dallying with the agency or a ruse to prolong negotiations and avoid sanctions." He added, "I'm clearat this stage, you need to give Iran a chance to prove its stated good will. Sanctions alone, I know for sure, are not going to lead to a durable solution."

Reacting to the report, the Bush administration repeated its determination to continue with its current approach. State Department Spokesman Tom Casey said: "There is no partial credit here. Iran has refused to comply with its international obligations, and, as a result of that, the international community is going to continue to ratchet up the pressure."

For his efforts to deal with Iran, the Washington Post published this scathing editorial on ElBaradei today, to which a colleague asked, "Does anybody know what is the Post smoking?"

ISIS Calls New IAEA-Iran Agreement 'Flawed'

David Albright and Jacqueline Shire at the Institute for Science and International Security have published a new report calling the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran on outstanding issues "flawed in important ways."

Among criticisms of the Agreement outlined in the new report are:
"The agreement states that aside from the issues identified in the document, there are 'no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities.' This is a sweeping statement that sets an unfortunate precedent regarding Iran's past nuclear activities, about which little is known in important areas. The document also refers to closing files, suggesting that IAEA or member states could be blocked from raising the issue again, even if significant new information emerged. The idea of 'closing files' violates fundamental safeguards principles.

"The agreement does not specify that Iran would provide the IAEA access to key people, facilities, and documents that are needed to verify Iranian answers to the IAEA's questions. Previous IAEA reports have noted the need for access to specific people and places . Without verification, Iranian answers cannot be accepted as truthful, given the many times Iran has misled IAEA inspectors.

"It also does not mention the matter of Iran's adherence to the Additional Protocol, without which it is all but impossible for the IAEA to ensure that Iran does not have undeclared nuclear materials and facilities, or verify Iran's statements under this agreement."

Click here to download the full report.

Iran's Agreement with the IAEA

Click here to download the pdf version.

Information Circular INFCIRC/71 1

Date: 27 August 2007

General DistributionOriginal: English

Communication dated 27 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency concerning the text of the "Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues."

The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 27 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran, attaching the text of the “Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues.” The Note Verbale and, as requested therein, the attached document are herewith attached for information.

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Permanent Mission ofISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN to the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) Heinestr. 19/1/1 A-1020 Vienna/AustriaPhone: (0043-1) 214 09 71 Fax: (0043-1) 114 09 73 E-mail: PM. Iran_AEA@chello.at No. 083/2007 27 August 2007

The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency presents its compliments to the Agency's Secretariat and has the honor to request the text of the "Understandings of Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues- to be circulated among the Member States and publish it as an INFCIRC document and make it available to the public through the IAEA website.

The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Agency's Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.

Office of External Relations and Policy Co-ordination

Attn: Mr. Vilmos CSERVENY Director, IAEA, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna

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Understandings of The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues Tehran
21 August 2007

Pursuant to the negotiations between H.E. Dr. Larijani, I. R. of Iran's Secretary of Supreme National Security Council and H.E. Dr. ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, in Vienna; following the initiative and good will of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the agreement made, a high ranking delegation consisting of the directors of technical, legal and political departments of the IAEA, paid a visit to Tehran from 11 to 12 July 2007 during which “Understandings of The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues, Tehran 12 July 2007” were prepared.

A second meeting took place in Vienna on 24 July 2007 followed by a further meeting in Iran from 20 to 21 August 2007. The Agency's delegation had the opportunity to have meetings with H.E. Dr. Larijani during both visits to Tehran. Following these three consecutive meetings, both Parties reached the following understandings:

I. Latest Developments:

Based on the modalities agreed upon on 12 July 2007, the following decisions were made:

1. Present Issues:

A. Enrichment Programme

The Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate in preparing the safeguards approach for the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant in accordance with Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The draft text of the safeguards approach paper, and the facility attachment of IRN- were provided to Iran on 23 July 2007. The safeguards approach and the facility attachment were discussed during technical meetings in Iran between the Agency and the AEOI from 6 to 8 August 2007. Further discussions will be held with the aim of finalizing the facility attachment by the end of September 2007.

B. Heavy Water Research Reactor in Arak

Iran agreed with the Agency's request to visit the heavy water research reactor (IR40) site in Arak. A successful visit took place on 30 July 2007.

C. Designation of new inspectors

On 12 July 2007, Iran accepted the designation of five additional inspectors.

D. Issue of multiple entry visas

On 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to issue one year multiple entry visas for 14 inspectors and staff of the Agency.

2. Past Outstanding Issues:

A. Plutonium Experiments

In order to conclude and close the file of the issue of plutonium (Pu), the Agency provided Iran with the remaining questions on 23 July 2007. During a meeting in Iran between representatives of the Agency and Iran, Iran provided clarifications to the Agency that helped to explain the remaining questions. In addition, on 7 August 2007, Iran sent a letter to the Agency providing additional clarifications to some of the questions.

On 20 August 2007 the Agency stated that earlier statements made by Iran are consistent with the Agency.s findings, and thus this matter is resolved. This will be communicated officially by the Agency to Iran through a letter.

B. Issue of P1-P2

Based on agreed modalities of 12 July 2007, Iran and the Agency agreed the following procedural steps to resolve the P1-P2 issue. The proposed timeline assumes that the Agency announces the closure of the Pu-experiments outstanding issue by 31 August 2007, and its subsequent reporting in the Director General.s report to the September 2007 Board of Governors.

The Agency will provide all remaining questions on this issue by 31 August 2007. Iran and the Agency will have discussions in Iran on 24-25 September 2007 to clarify the questions provided. This will be followed up by a further meeting in mid-October 2007 to further clarify the written answers provided. The Agency's target date for the closure of this issue is November 2007.

C. Source of Contamination

Based on the agreed modalities on 12 July 2007 and given the Agency's findings which tend, on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of the observed HEU contamination, the only remaining outstanding issue on contamination is the contamination found at a Technical University in Tehran.

Iran and the Agency agreed on the following procedural steps to address this issue, starting once the P1-P2 issue is concluded and the file is closed. The Agency will again provide Iran with the remaining questions regarding the contamination found at a Technical University in Tehran by 15 September 2007. After 2 weeks of the closure of the P1-P2 issue Iran and the Agency will have discussions in Iran on this issue.

D. U Metal Document

Upon the request of the Agency, Iran agreed to cooperate with the Agency in facilitating the comparison of the relevant sections of the document. Iran is presently reviewing the proposals already made during the first meeting on 12 July 2007. After taking this step by Iran, the Agency undertakes to close this issue.

II. Modalities of Resolution of other Outstanding Issues

A. Po210

Based on agreed modalities of 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to deal with this issue, once all the above mentioned issues are concluded and their files are closed. Iran and the Agency agreed upon the following procedural steps: regarding this issue, the Agency will provide Iran in writing with all its remaining questions by 15 September 2007. After 2 weeks from conclusion and closure of the issues of the source of contamination and U-metal, reflected in the Director General's report to the Board of Governors, Iran and the Agency will have discussions in Iran where Iran will provide explanations on the Po2 10.B.

Ghachine Mine

Based on agreed modalities of 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to deal with this issue, once the issue of Po210 is concluded and its file is closed. Iran and the Agency agreed upon the following procedural steps: regarding this issue, the Agency will provide Iran in writing with all its remaining questions by 15 September 2007. After 2 weeks from conclusion and closure of the issue of Po2 10, reflected in the Director General's report to the Board of Governors, Iran and the Agency will have discussions in Iran where Iran will provide explanations to the Agency about Ghachine Mine.

III. Alleged Studies

Iran reiterated that it considers the following alleged studies as politically motivated and baseless allegations. The Agency will however provide Iran with access to the documentation it has in its possession regarding: the Green Salt Project, the high explosive testing and the missile re-entry vehicle.As a sign of good will and cooperation with the Agency, upon receiving all related documents, Iran will review and inform the Agency of its assessment.

IV. General Understandings

1. These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency confirmed that there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities.

2. The Agency agreed to provide Iran with all remaining questions according to the above work plan. This means that after receiving the questions, no other questions are left. Iran will provide the Agency with the required clarifications and information.

3. The Agency's delegation is of the view that the agreement on the above issues shall further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities.

4. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran and has therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use.

5. The Agency and Iran agreed that after the implementation of the above work plan and the agreed modalities for resolving the outstanding issues, the implementation of safeguards in Iran will be conducted in a routine manner.

Progress on Nuclear Talks

There were several articles today regarding progress made in talks between the IAEA and Iran. Both parties said after two days of meetings in Tehran that they had made progress in talks about Iran's offer of more transparancy aimed at defusing concerns over the nuclear program. They also said they had agreed to a timeline on answering outstanding questions.

IAEA deputy director Olli Heinonen said they had "an agreed working plan and a timeline for implementation." He also said the talks were "good, constructive."

Meanwhile, the US criticized the agreement and urged the UN and allies to implement more sanctions on Iran.

Here are three articles: Reuters/ AP/ AFP

New Round of IAEA and Iran Talks Ends with Modality

Two days of talks between the International Atomic Energy Agency led by Olli Heinonen and Iranian nuclear negotiators led by Javad Vaeedi ended today with an agreement on what they are calling a “modality” for moving forward on negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The “modality” includes four to five steps in the next two to three weeks to resolve outstanding issues. Jeffrey Lewis posted on what he prefers to call the "action plan" here.