Final Language on Iran in the House Defense Authorization Bill

On May 22, the House of Representatives voted 384-23 to pass the Fiscal Year 2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act. Section 1224 of the bill requires that the Director of National Intelligence submit to Congress an update of the National Intelligence Estimate not later than 180 days after the legislation is enacted and then annually thereafter. Below is the full finalized text of Section 1224. The Senate must still debate its version of the bill and is expected to take it up on the floor in June.

SEC. 1224. REQUIREMENT TO UPDATE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.

(a) Requirement- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act , and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress an update of the National Intelligence Estimate, entitled `Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities' and dated November 2007. Such update may be submitted in classified form.

(b) Elements to Be Considered- Each update submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) The locations, types, and number of centrifuges and other specialized equipment necessary for the enrichment of nuclear material and any plans to develop and operate such equipment in the future.
(2) An estimate of the amount, if any, of enriched to weapons-grade uranium materials acquired or produced to date and plutonium acquired or produced and reprocessed into weapons-grade material to date, an estimate of the amount of plutonium that is likely to be produced and reprocessed into weapons-grade material in the near- and midterms and the amount of uranium that is likely to be enriched to weapons-grade levels in the near- and midterms, and the number of nuclear weapons that could be produced with each category of materials.
(3) A description of the security and safeguards at any nuclear site that could prevent, slow, verify or monitor the enrichment of uranium or the reprocessing of plutonium into weapons-grade materials.
(4) A description of the weaponization activities, such as the research, design, development, or testing of nuclear weapons or weapons-related components.
(5) A description of programs to construct, acquire, test, or improve methods to deliver nuclear weapons, including an assessment of the likely progress of such programs in the near- and mid-terms.
(6) A summary of assessments made by other allies of the United States of Iran's nuclear weapons program and nuclear-capable delivery systems programs.

(c) Notification- The President shall notify Congress, in writing, within 15 days of determining that--
(1) the Islamic Republic of Iran has met or surpassed any major milestone in its nuclear weapons program; or
(2) Iran has undertaken to accelerate, decelerate, or cease the development of any significant element within its nuclear weapons program.

New Sanctions Resolution Introduced into the House of Representatives

Representatives Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and Mike Pence (R-IN) are circulating a “Dear Colleague” letter on the hill to drum up co-sponsors for H.Con.Res. 362, introduced on May 22, 2008. The legislation expresses “the sense of Congress regarding the threat posed to international peace, stability in the Middle East, and the vital national security interests of the United States by Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and regional hegemony, and for other purposes” and urges the President to impose new sanctions on Iran.

H.Con.Res. 362 resolves that Congress:

(1) declares that preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, through all appropriate economic, political, and diplomatic means, is vital to the national security interests of the United States and must be dealt with urgently;

(2) urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on--
(A) the Central Bank of Iran and any other Iranian bank engaged in proliferation activities or the support of terrorist groups;
(B) international banks which continue to conduct financial transactions with proscribed Iranian banks;
(C) energy companies that have invested $20,000,000 or more in the Iranian petroleum or natural gas sector in any given year since the enactment of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996; and
(D) all companies which continue to do business with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps;

(3) demands that the President initiate an international effort to immediately and dramatically increase the economic, political, and diplomatic pressure on Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities by, inter alia, prohibiting the export to Iran of all refined petroleum products; imposing stringent inspection requirements on all persons, vehicles, ships, planes, trains, and cargo entering or departing Iran; and prohibiting the international movement of all Iranian officials not involved in negotiating the suspension of Iran's nuclear program; and

(4) urges the President to lead a sustained, serious, and forceful effort at regional diplomacy to support the legitimate governments in the region against Iranian efforts to destabilize them, to reassure our friends and allies that the United States supports them in their resistance to Iranian efforts at hegemony, and to make clear to the Government of Iran that the United States will protect America's vital national security interests in the Middle East.

Below is the full “Dear Colleague” letter requesting co-sponsorship of the legislation.

Take a Stand Against Iranian Bullying:
Co-Sponsor H. Con. Res. 362

May 28, 2008

Dear Colleague:

We write to encourage you to join us as sponsors of H.Con.Res.362, a resolution expressing the sense of Congress regarding the threat posed to international peace, stability in the Middle East, and the vital national security interests of the United States by Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and regional hegemony.

As the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, we have been monitoring with growing concern Iran's manifest efforts to destabilize and reshape the Middle East, to block efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and, worst of all, to acquire the means to produce enriched uranium, the key to producing nuclear weapons.

Iran is backing and arming militias and terrorists fighting the United States and our allies in both Iraq and Afghanistan; it is the proud patron of both the Hamas take-over in Gaza and the Hezbollah insurrection against the Lebanese government; it is the major funding source for numerous terrorist groups and, increasingly, its fellow state-sponsor of terrorism, Syria; it is supporting Islamist sectarian groups in places like Kuwait, Bahrain and Yemen; and, it is radically reorienting regional security calculations (e.g., the sudden interest among Sunni Arabs in commercial nuclear power).

In various public statements, Iranian leaders proudly take ownership of these policies and promise more of the same. Meeting the threat posed by Iran is an urgent requirement for the United States, and a challenge that will require us to work closely with the international community, and especially with partners in the Middle East. Though the stakes are high and time is short, the resolution is explicit in stating that meeting the challenge from Iran must be done using all appropriate political, diplomatic and economic levers, and that "nothing in this resolution shall be construed as an authorization of the use of force against Iran."

The threat from Iran is real and growing, and Congress needs to sound the alarm to ensure that today's efforts by Iran at subversion and proliferation do not, tomorrow, become the seeds of new and more terrible conflict in the Middle East.

Please contact Dalis Blumenfeld (dalis.blumenfeld@mail.house.gov) at the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia at 202-225-3345 if you'd like to be added as a sponsor.

Sincerely,

s/ Gary L. Ackerman s/ Mike Pence

Iran's Offer

On May 13, Iranian Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki delivered a letter and “Proposed Package for Constructive Negotiations” to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The letter and offer was delivered just before European Union Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana is set to travel to Iran to deliver a “not-so-new package of incentives” from the so-called P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Germany, U.S. and Russia) meant to convince the country to abandon its nuclear enrichment activities.

The English translation of the Iranian offer available is unofficial and very crude and thus may accurately reflect what the offer is actually meant to convey. However, a few observations can still be made. Perhaps of most significance, the letter and offer delivered by Foreign Minister Mottaki stresses a long-standing issue for the Iranians of the need to approach negotiations with mutual respect.

The Iranian offer may also be viewed as a preemptive measure to the “new package of incentives” to be delivered by the P5+1. Though there are some additional incentives in the P5+1 offer, including enhanced nuclear cooperation, it does not include U.S.-backed security assurances that it will not attack Iran. Most importantly, the U.S. adamantly maintains the precondition that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities before negotiations can even begin, which Iran refuses to do.

The Iranian offer is likely a reflection of the view inside the government that they will just wait out the current U.S. administration because they do not see the possibility for real dialogue at present. In light of this, the Iranian government has perhaps made this offer mostly for media purposes.

In the offer, the Iranian government presents itself as a global player, equal to all of the members of the P5+1. Iran says it is willing to enter into talks with the P5+1 “on cooperation to strengthen a just peace and bolster the stability and the advancement of democracy in regions that suffer from instability, militarism, violence and terrorism. Such cooperation can take place in different parts of the world- more specifically in the Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, and Latin America. Cooperation to assist the Palestinian people to find a comprehensive plan- one that is sustainable, democratic and fair- to resolve the 60-year old Palestinian issue can become a symbol of such collaboration.” There is no mention of security guarantees in the Iranian offer.

The offer also calls for talks between the P5+1 and Iran to include cooperation on Economic issues, including in the energy sector, trade and investment, common effort to help fight poverty in less developed countries and reducing the impact of sharp price fluctuations and retooling global monetary and financial arrangements.

In regards to the nuclear issue, the Iranian offer does not mention its own nuclear program and instead proposes discussing the nuclear issue in the global context and a focus on disarmament. The offer calls for talks to include:

• Obtaining a further assurance about the non-diversion of the nuclear activities of different countries.
• Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world- including in Iran.
• Cooperation to access and utilize peaceful nuclear technology and facilitating its usage by all states.
• Nuclear disarmament and establishment of a follow up committee.
• Improved supervision by the IAEA over the nuclear activities of different states.
• Joint collaboration over nuclear safety and physical protection.
• An effort to encourage other states to control the export of nuclear material and equipment.

The failure of the P5+1 to produce a credible offer to Iran without preconditions and with security assurances has essentially ensured that substantive talks over Iran’s nuclear program are not going anywhere anytime soon. The Iranian position has only further hardened and as the Iranian offer demonstrates, it has only become more difficult to break the impasse. Tough-minded resolve from all parties to engage in difficult give-and-take of diplomacy, as well as creative diplomatic solutions are urgently needed to prevent the situation from further deterioriating.

Udpate on Iran Amendments to Defense Authorization Bill

Of the major amendments proposed on Iran to the Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Authorization Act, only the Spratt amendment was ruled germane by the Committee Rule, which passed on Wednesday, May 21. The House of Representatives is expected to complete debate and vote on the Defense Authorization bill before the Memorial Day recess.

The Spratt (SC) amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence, on an annual basis, to submit to Congress an update of the National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities" and dated November 2007. Such update may be submitted in classified form. The President shall notify Congress in writing within 15 days of determining that Iran has met or surpassed any major milestone in its nuclear weapons program or that Iran has undertaken to accelerate, decelerate, or cease the development of any significant element within its nuclear weapons program.

Summary and links to Text of Major Amendments on Iran in the Defense Authorization Bill

Summary and links to Text of Major Amendments on Iran
Submitted to the Rules Committee for the Defense Authorization Bill
As of May 20, 2008 7:59 PM

Franks (AZ) #53
States the Sense of Congress that the Department of Defense should develop and maintain a viable military option to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from successfully developing or deploying a nuclear weapons capability.

Lee (CA) #71 (Ed. note: this amendment could be construed as Iran-related by prohibiting funding for Iraq war to extend beyond Iraq)
(REVISED) Provides that funds appropriated for Operation Iraqi Freedom or otherwise made available to DOD pursuant to an authorization of appropriations may be obligated and expended within Iraq only (1) to protect service members participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom and (2) to accomplish the safe and complete redeployment of service members and contractors pursuant to a plan that provides for their complete redeployment within one year of enactment. Nothing shall prohibit diplomatic efforts or social and economic reconstruction activities in Iraq.

McDermott (WA) #91
States the Sense of Congress that the United States should seek open communication and responsible diplomacy with certain key state actors in order to reduce regional and global tensions.

Spratt (SC) #128
Requires the DNI, on an annual basis, to submit to Congress an update of the National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities" and dated November 2007. Such update may be submitted in classified form. The President shall notify Congress in writing within 15 days of determining that Iran has met or surpassed any major milestone in its nuclear weapons program or that Iran has undertaken to accelerate, decelerate, or cease the development of any significant element within its nuclear weapons program.

Iran's Offer

The Institute for Science and International Security has obtained and posted a copy of Iran's May 13, 2008 letter to the United Nations Secretary General and accompanying document titled "The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Proposed Package for Constructive Negotiations." Read it here.

Even More on the 123 Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia

Ivan Oelrich has an excellent posting on the Federation of American Scientists blog today regarding the proposed 123 Agreement for nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. I wholeheartedly agree with Ivan’s analysis on Iran, “that the Russians have, overall, been responsible in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program and have come up with some innovative ideas.” I also agree that there are much better arguments than Iran for opposing the agreement, as I have said in previous postings here and here.

In his analysis, Oelrich points out that the 123 agreement with Russia may be part of an effort to bolster the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. In addition to Russia, the U.S. is pushing agreements for nuclear cooperation with all of the Middle East countries that have expressed interest in developing a nuclear program since the 2006 appeal from Secretary General of the Arab League and former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Musa to the Arab world, “to quickly and powerfully enter the world of using nuclear power.” In the memoranda of understanding with Middle Eastern countries signed thus far, the U.S. is tying GNEP to nuclear cooperation with these countries. This, I think, bolsters Oelrich’s argument for fighting GNEP directly, rather than individual agreements for cooperation.

In an article for the Middle East Report on this subject to be published this summer, I argue, among other things, that the U.S. is selling GNEP as part of the nuclear cooperation packages in part because it needs a lucrative market to sell a new generation of reactors and fuel. Convincing countries in the Middle East to forego domestic reprocessing and enrichment also bolsters U.S. plans to reprocess fuel from domestic and foreign reactors for use in a new generation of reactors. However, this is a highly unstable and hypocritical policy that will only widen the gap between the nuclear haves and have-nots. Addressing the deep-seeded inequalities of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime is far more likely than nuclear cooperation agreements to mitigate proliferation concerns in the Middle East and around the world.