New Assessment Calls for Security Council Action on Iran

A new assessment of the most recent International Atomic Energy Agency's report on Iran released this week by the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University in Israel concludes that the two main areas for concern in the report are the "current uranium enrichment activities" and "possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear development program. The assessment argues that it is now up to the United Nations Security Council to decide how things will go.

The assessment states there are "three main possible future directions: strong economic and diplomatic sanctions to force Iran into serious negotiations; military action; or a nuclear Iran. The Council can and should act if it does not want the situation to further deteriorate." It recommends that the Security Council "adopt a threefold program: a) prohibit sale of any goods to Iran with the exception of food and medical supplies b) prohibit external travel of Iranian residents by not issuing entry visas to UN member states except for humanitarian or health reasons or for negotiating purposes, and c) start, with the appointment of a sub-committee or other agreed negotiators, serious ongoing negotiations with Iran on the complete cessation of nuclear fuel activities in Iran and on vital mutual security issues, including security guarantees to Iran, abandonment of Iranian assistance to terror organizations, and the establishment of normal relations with all nations."

The assessment concludes, "If the Security Council or major political blocs do not quickly agree on the strong sanctions-negotiations route, the possibility of a military action will become more realistic. If that does not happen, there will be no way to avoid the least desirable option – a nuclear weapons Iran"

New IAEA Report on Iran

The Institute for Science and International Security has published the September 15, 2008 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report by Director General Mohammed ElBaradei on Iran on its website.

According to the report, the IAEA has been able to continue to verify non-diversion of declared nuclear material. Iran has provided the IAEA with access to the material and to accounting records. "However, Iran has not implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information."

According to the report, "There remain a number of outstanding issues, identified in the Director General’s last report to the Board (GOV/2008/15, para. 14), which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme." To resolve outstanding questions related to the alleged weaponization studies and other key outstanding issues that remain of serious concern, the report calls on Iran to "provide more information on the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document; clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries." The IAEA also calls on Iran to provide relevant documentation and access to individuals. According to the Director General's report, "Unless Iran provides such transparency, and implements the Additional Protocol, the Agency will not be able to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran."

The report also notes that Iran has not suspended its enrichment activities, as demanded by Security Council resolutions. Iran has also continued to make some progress on the installation of new cascades and the operation of a new generation of centrifuges "for test purposes."

In response to the report, China called on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA, but distanced itself from calls for sanctions, saying that sanctions will not resolve the nuclear crisis. Meanwhile, talks between German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki on September 15 left much to be desired, according to reports. Steinmeier reiterated that the June offer to Iran from the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany was serious.

New Policy Briefing on Iran

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has just published a new policy brief by George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies and Director of the Nonproliferation Program, entitled, "Iran Says 'No' - Now What?" Perkovich argues that the cost of defiance of United Nations Security Council demands for Iran to halt enrichment activities should be greater, but the benefits of cooperation should also be greater. Perkovich offers a three-step approach for the next U.S. president:

• Give Iran one last, time-limited chance to negotiate suspension of its fuel-cycle-related activities. The European Union, Russia, China, and the United States have consistently increased offers of incentives to Iran without signs that Iran is willing to negotiate at all. Interlocutors should set a date to stop bidding unless Iran clarifies that there are conditions under which it would suspend.

• If Iran rejects the opportunity, break off negotiations and focus on developing a consensus to maintain international sanctions as long as Iran remains in violation of Security Council and IAEA resolutions. Rather than defending a redline Iran already crossed, the United States should build resolve within the UN Security Council and among allies for continued sanctions and robust consequences should evidence emerge of new Iranian weaponization activities.

• Finally, clarify the international redline. Even if Iran is able to weather sanctions, it may be persuaded to accept stringent safeguards and verifications inspections to prevent weaponization. Iran insists it has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, but the international community could define its redline for Iran as weaponization, further violation of nonproliferation obligations, or withdrawal from the NPT. The United States and the Security Council should insist on an understanding that the use of military force would be authorized should evidence of ongoing weaponization activities emerge. However, military force must be limited to enforcement of nonproliferation obligations and not encompass a wider campaign to weaken or destroy the Iranian government.

HFAC Members Go to New York

On July 22, 2008, House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Chairperson Howard Berman (D-CA) led a delegation of committee members to New York to meet with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, U.S. envoy to the U.N. Zalmay Khalilzad, Undersecretary General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe and the U.N. representatives of Britain, France, Russia and China. According to HFAC announcement, the delegation received briefings on a wide array of issues, "including Iran's nuclear weapons program" (their words, not mine).

Other members of the delegation were: Gary Ackerman (D-NY), Donald Payne (D-NJ), Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Lynn Woolsey (D-CA), Steve Chabot (R-OH), Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX), Gregory W. Meeks (D-NY), Joe Crowley (D-NY), Dianne Watson (D-CA), Brad Miller (D-NC), David Scott (D-GA), Russ Carnahan (D-MO), Jim Costa (D-CA), Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE), Albio Sires (D-NJ), Ron Klein (D-FL), and Shelley Berkley (D-NV) (a former member of the committee and current leader of the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue).

The delegation coincided with a periodic meeting of the Security Council on the Middle East. Inner City Press is the only media outlet so far to carry a story on the delegation. Little else is known.

Flynt Leverett on P5+1 Talks

Ambassador Pickering on Direct Talks with Iran & Multilateral Enrichment

Just Foreign Policy has posted an interview with Ambassador Thomas Pickering on You Tube.

New CRS Report on Iran's Nuclear Program

The Congressional Research Service has published a new report by Paul K. Kerr on the status of Iran's nuclear program. The report can be downloaded from the Federation of American Scientists' website here.

Iran's Offer

On May 13, Iranian Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki delivered a letter and “Proposed Package for Constructive Negotiations” to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The letter and offer was delivered just before European Union Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana is set to travel to Iran to deliver a “not-so-new package of incentives” from the so-called P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Germany, U.S. and Russia) meant to convince the country to abandon its nuclear enrichment activities.

The English translation of the Iranian offer available is unofficial and very crude and thus may accurately reflect what the offer is actually meant to convey. However, a few observations can still be made. Perhaps of most significance, the letter and offer delivered by Foreign Minister Mottaki stresses a long-standing issue for the Iranians of the need to approach negotiations with mutual respect.

The Iranian offer may also be viewed as a preemptive measure to the “new package of incentives” to be delivered by the P5+1. Though there are some additional incentives in the P5+1 offer, including enhanced nuclear cooperation, it does not include U.S.-backed security assurances that it will not attack Iran. Most importantly, the U.S. adamantly maintains the precondition that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities before negotiations can even begin, which Iran refuses to do.

The Iranian offer is likely a reflection of the view inside the government that they will just wait out the current U.S. administration because they do not see the possibility for real dialogue at present. In light of this, the Iranian government has perhaps made this offer mostly for media purposes.

In the offer, the Iranian government presents itself as a global player, equal to all of the members of the P5+1. Iran says it is willing to enter into talks with the P5+1 “on cooperation to strengthen a just peace and bolster the stability and the advancement of democracy in regions that suffer from instability, militarism, violence and terrorism. Such cooperation can take place in different parts of the world- more specifically in the Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, and Latin America. Cooperation to assist the Palestinian people to find a comprehensive plan- one that is sustainable, democratic and fair- to resolve the 60-year old Palestinian issue can become a symbol of such collaboration.” There is no mention of security guarantees in the Iranian offer.

The offer also calls for talks between the P5+1 and Iran to include cooperation on Economic issues, including in the energy sector, trade and investment, common effort to help fight poverty in less developed countries and reducing the impact of sharp price fluctuations and retooling global monetary and financial arrangements.

In regards to the nuclear issue, the Iranian offer does not mention its own nuclear program and instead proposes discussing the nuclear issue in the global context and a focus on disarmament. The offer calls for talks to include:

• Obtaining a further assurance about the non-diversion of the nuclear activities of different countries.
• Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world- including in Iran.
• Cooperation to access and utilize peaceful nuclear technology and facilitating its usage by all states.
• Nuclear disarmament and establishment of a follow up committee.
• Improved supervision by the IAEA over the nuclear activities of different states.
• Joint collaboration over nuclear safety and physical protection.
• An effort to encourage other states to control the export of nuclear material and equipment.

The failure of the P5+1 to produce a credible offer to Iran without preconditions and with security assurances has essentially ensured that substantive talks over Iran’s nuclear program are not going anywhere anytime soon. The Iranian position has only further hardened and as the Iranian offer demonstrates, it has only become more difficult to break the impasse. Tough-minded resolve from all parties to engage in difficult give-and-take of diplomacy, as well as creative diplomatic solutions are urgently needed to prevent the situation from further deterioriating.

Iran's Offer

The Institute for Science and International Security has obtained and posted a copy of Iran's May 13, 2008 letter to the United Nations Secretary General and accompanying document titled "The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Proposed Package for Constructive Negotiations." Read it here.

Iraq, the Nuclear Issue, Aghanistan and the Gulf: The View from Tehran

Selig Harrison, Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, gave a briefing today at the Woodrow Wilson Center where he is also Senior Scholar. Harrison reported on the view from Tehran based on two trips there in the past nine months, most recently in February. His trips were funded by the Trust for Mutual Understanding. Harrison prefaced his remarks with the fact that he went to Iran with the specific objective to see what is possible in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. He was not able to meet one-on-one with either President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but he did meet with many of their key advisors. Most signicanlty, the Iranian Foreign Ministry arranged a meeting with 15 experts that work on Iraq.

Harrison focused most of his remarks on Iran’s view of Iraq beginning with an apropos comment from Mahmoud Vaezi, Deputy of Foreign Policy Research at Center for Strategic Research in Tehran. Vaezi told Harrison, “We have been waiting for this moment since 1639,” meaning that Iran has been waiting for the day when Sunni minority rule would end in Baghdad and Iran would restore its influence.

Harrison said that President Bush clearly did not have the Shi’a connection on his mind when he toppled Sadam Hussein and he pointed to comments by Douglas Feith who has said he believed in 2003 that invading Iraq might speed up the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to Feith, “It was unclear to us how it would all net out and it is still unclear.” He thought that Iranians would be inspired by the “Iraqi revolution.” Feith still calls what’s happening in Iraq a revolution. Paul Wolfowitz was more realistic and believed a Shiite dominated Iraq would never be a puppet of Iran.

But what about an Iraq that is closer to Iran than any other external power? The U.S. was slow to learn that the politicians in power in Iraq have had close ties to Iran.

Harrison thinks it’s obvious the U.S. has embarked on a new military strategy in Sadr City. Iran has carefully avoided playing favorites in Iraq, but the U.S. has not. Harrison said he has heard Iranian anger over the U.S. role in Sadr City and said the timing of the escalation in Hizbollah attacks in Lebanon might be linked to the U.S. decision to step up military action against the Mahdi army. Harrison also said the Iranian suspension of a fourth round of talks with the U.S. over Iraqi security is also a result of situation in Sadr City. Many Iranians asked Harrison, “How can the U.S. accuse us of interfering in Iraq?”

The U.S. has to give serious attention to Iran’s view of what must be done in Iraq. There can be no graceful withdrawal from Iraq without Iranian cooperation. Iran wants a stable Iraq, what they define as a “friendly Iraq.” Their effort is to keep a hand in with all actors so they end up with friends in power. Harrison said the importance of Iran-Iraq war can not be overemphasized enough as the basic context for Iran’s view of the situation in Iraq and in context of the nuclear issue.

Iran is ready to cooperate in stabilizing Iraq, but only if U.S. is willing to set a timetable for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq. In return for stabilizing Iraq, the basic U.S. quid pro quo would be accepting Iran’s right to be a major player in Iraq. Acceptance by Saudi Arabia is also implicit.

Iran has carefully avoided taking sides in current Shiite internal struggle and wants the U.S. to do the same. It has also attempted to keep on good terms with all Shia factions. They do prefer al-Hakim as the preeminent force in the Shi’a community in Iraq, but they are being careful to keep their Revolutionary Guard relationships with Muqtada al-Sadr. Essentially, they are hedging their bets in Iraq. It is important to stop the slaughter in Sadr City because it puts Iran in an awkward position, particularly as it has been restraining Muqtada al-Sadr, so far, something Harrison was repeatedly told. It is pretty clear that the March 2008 truce was brokered by an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp general. A Shiastan in the South is also a very important question.

The safest way to predict what would come out of any Modus Vivendi between the U.S. and Iran over Iraq is when withdrawal is completed. But, according to Harrison, in a Modus Vivendi, Iran would pledge not to give missiles capable of hitting green zone. It would end aid to militias in Iraq when U.S. forces are withdrawn and it would help with eliminating al Qaeda in Iraq. Iranians also focus on security guarantees that U.S. bases in Iraq will not be used to attack Iran. Iran also does not want an independent Kurdistan. For a graceful U.S. withdrawal, Iran expects the U.S. to end aide to Party for a Fee Live in Kurdistan (PJAK) and other groups, in particular separatist groups in Balouchistan.

Two Iranian demands would be particularly difficult to get through U.S. policy process. Iran wants the U.S. to end support for Mujahideen al Khalq (MEK) fighters who have been kept at Camp Ahsraf in Iraq for the last five years. Iran wants the U.S. to put MEK fighters through a Red Cross screening process so they can return to Iran.

Iranians are very angry now about what they see as a shift in U.S. policy since the 2005 Iraqi elections. In their perception, they see the Sunni Awakening as an abandonment of support for a Shiite dominated Iraq that resulted from the 2005 elections. Iran wants the U.S. to stop building up Sunni militias, but it is not going to be easy to roll back the Sunni Awakening. As Steven Simon points out “The Price of the Surge” the U.S. made deals “mediated by tribal leaders and consisted of payments of $360 per month per combatant in exchange for allegiance and cooperation… The total number [of combatants] across Iraq is estimated at over 90,000… The Sunni sheiks, meanwhile, are getting rich from the surge. The United States has budgeted $150 million to pay Sunni tribal groups this year, and the sheiks take as much as 20 percent of every payment to a former insurgent -- which means that commanding 200 fighters can be worth well over a hundred thousand dollars a year for a tribal chief.”

The U.S. has started something that will be difficult to stop. Ending the Sunni Awakening is important to re-establishing stability. As George Packer pointed out in an article for the New Yorker, Sunni awakening policy is seen as indicative of the long-range goals of the U.S. in Iraq.

But, what will happen to the Sunnis? They will have to accept rule by the Shiite majority, just as Shiites had to accept Sunni rule for the last five centuries. President Bush assigned the Sunnis to this status when he overthrew Saddam Hussein.

For this reason, a U.S.-Iran agreement must be accompanied by a broader regional agreement. Iran is ready for a regional approach. The U.S. media has given little attention to Iran’s efforts to work on regional cooperation.

Regarding Iranian views of cooperation over Afghanistan, Harrison said his best meeting was with Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of Majlis, who like many other Iranians, said that Iran cooperated with the U.S. to defeat the Taliban after the September 11, 2001 attacks. “Our reward was membership in the Axis of Evil,” Boroujerdi said. Harrison said there is a tremendous feeling of unreciprocated overtures in Iran.

Iranians still believe there are areas for serious cooperation with the U.S. over Afghanistan, particularly with halting narcotics trafficking. Iranians dismissed U.S. claims their helping the Taliban and completely are with U.S. in opposing them. Harrison said it is interesting to note that U.S. accusations on this have died down.

Regarding the Gulf, Harrison said the Iranians have a very pragmatic attitude. No one expects the U.S. to completely withdraw militarily from the gulf. But the carriers represent the biggest threat, especially as they are equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. Removal of carriers from the Gulf would be Iran’s first demand.

Harrison said there was a good reception in Iran for the idea of a reduction of U.S. military presence in the Gulf as proposed by Kenneth Pollack from Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. Pollack argues, “The best way for the United States to address the rise of terrorism and the threat of internal instability in Saudi Arabia and the other [Gulf Cooperation Council] states would be to reduce its military presence in the region to the absolute minimum, or even to withdraw entirely.” The Navy could remain in Bahrain, but there must be fewer American warships. Harrison notes the difficulty comes with Iran’s desires for expansion.

Harrison said the U.S. media portrays Iran as trouble-maker in the Gulf. However, since King Abdullah came to power in Saudi Arabia and since Rafsanjani’s haj when he was president, there has been a marked Saudi-Iran bi-polar balance. Saudi-Iranian political tensions can be serious, but that does not mean that Saudi Arabia is willing to engage militarily.

Finally, regarding the nuclear program, Harrison said the U.S. is not serious about a negotiated settlement otherwise it would not be insisting on suspension of uranium enrichment as a precondition. He noted that nuclear negotiations between Iran and the European Union in 2004-05 were based on a bargain that the EU failed to honor. Iran did suspend enrichment efforts for more than half a year. The EU promised to put forward security guarantees and economic incentives, but it could not produce the security guarantees. Many Iranians, including former Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Javad Zarif, put their reputations on the line to convince the powers in Iran to suspend and the U.S. was unwilling to cooperate on security assurances. All factions in Iran agree that they should not be conned again.

Is a nuclear settlement possible? Harrison argues that given a settlement in Iraq, it would be possible to get a freeze at some point in future negotiations under International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. But reciprocity would be required and the U.S. would have to make a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against Iran. Harrison believes establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone agreement in the Persian Gulf should be part of the settlement. He said no one in Tehran talked about a security agreement extending beyond the Gulf into the Middle East. He said the U.S. could rule out using nuclear weapons in gulf without doing so in the Middle East and this would not hurt its policy on Israel.

The Not-so-new Package of Incentives

On May 2, Britain, China, France, Germany, U.S. and Russia (the so-called Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany or P5+1) announced they would offer a “new package of incentives” to Iran meant to convince the country to abandon its nuclear enrichment activities. Though the text of the package has not been revealed, all press reports indicate that the package is not so “new” and not much has changed from previous offers to Iran. If the “new package of incentives” does not include U.S.-backed security assurances and if it does contain any precondition before negotiations can begin, then it is not an offer Iran is likely to accept.

According to diplomats familiar with the process, the “package of incentives” has been “refreshed” from the last offer delivered in May 2006 to include enhanced nuclear cooperation. According to one U.S. official, Russia and China had pushed for “troublesome” additions to the package, including “more political facilitation” and “more flexibility on certain aspects of nuclear cooperation,” but these were not included.

It is still unclear when the “new package of incentives” will be delivered to Iran as well as it is unclear who will deliver it and who it will be delivered to on the Iranian side. It is also unknown whether this package of incentives will have a deadline for response as the May 2006 offer did. Although U.S. officials accuse Iran of rejecting the offer before it has even been delivered, Iran has neither received nor responded to the “new package of incentives.”

Iran officially maintains it will not suspend uranium enrichment activities. Though he did not specifically mention the nuclear program, in a speech given in Fars Province on May 4, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said “threats will not force the Iranian nation to retreat” and stated, “Have you not tested the Iranian nation? We will forcefully continue on our path and will not allow the oppressors to step on our rights.” Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said he warned British Foreign Minister David Miliband when they recently met at a multilateral meeting on Iraq in Kuwait not to cross any “red lines” in preparing an offer to Iran.

If the P5+1 wants the incentives package to truly entice Iran to the negotiating table, then it should drop preconditions requiring Iran suspend uranium enrichment before talks can even begin. This precondition only undermines the sincerity of the offer to enter into talks that are aimed at achieving the precondition. Any serious “new package of incentives” offered by the P5+1 must also include U.S.-backed security assurances it will not attack Iran. Without these measures, the “new package of incentives” remains a vapid gesture that Iran is not likely to accept.

Reliance on Military Force to Prevent Proliferation Is Risky Business

On April 29, President George W. Bush gave a full explanation for why the administration chose to reveal previously classified intelligence on the Syrian nuclear facility the U.S. claims was built by North Korea and destroyed by Israeli airstrikes on September 6, 2007. According to President Bush, the timing for the release of the information was meant to send a warning to Syria, North Korea and Iran to advance “certain policy objectives.”

President Bush said, “One would be to the North Koreans, to make it abundantly clear that we know more about them than they think. Then we have an interest in sending a message to Iran, and the world, for that matter, about just how destabilizing nuclear proliferation would be in the Middle East.” He said another objective was to send a message to Syria about “their intransigence in dealing with, you know, helping us in Iraq or destabilizing Lebanon or dealing with Hamas.”

President Bush said the information wasn’t released sooner for fear Syria would retaliate against Israel, but was released instead “at a time when, you know, we felt the risk of retaliation or, you know, confrontation in the Middle East was reduced.” Threatening Syria for not helping in Iraq, Lebanon or Gaza, in particular, is a counterproductive strategy for obtaining cooperation.

CIA Director Michael Hayden claimed on April 28 that the Syrian facility could have been used to make nuclear weapons. According to Hayden, “In the course of a year after they got full up they would have produced enough plutonium for one or two weapons.”

Even if the facility could have been used to make nuclear weapons, which Syria denies, Israel’s military strikes on the facility, in violation of international law, was extremely risky and have furthered a very dangerous precedent for the preventive military option set by the U.S. invasion of Iraq under spurious claims Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction.

A far better approach to dealing with the Syrian facility would have been for Israel and the U.S. to reveal any intelligence on the facility to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The military strikes eliminated the possibility for the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify intelligence and collect any additional intelligence. Through their military demonstration and acting on their own, Israel and the U.S. have undermined established mechanisms for dealing with nuclear proliferation and the international nonproliferation regime in general.

Furthermore, military threats are unlikely to influence the countries whose behavior the U.S. and Israel seek to change. In the case of Iran, repeated threats of military attacks have failed to produce any change in the Iranian government’s behavior. Instead, threats have contributed to strengthening the hand of the hardliners in Iran and made life more difficult for those inside of Iran working for democracy and reform.

Indeed, reliance on military force to prevent proliferation will likely backfire and result in strengthening the resolve of countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons as a means of defense against military strikes. Threats of military attacks against nuclear facilities will only incentivize developing nuclear programs in secret rather than developing them under international safeguards and the watchful eye of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Rather than using military force or evening threatening the use of military force as a first resort, the U.S. and Israel should abide by international laws and work within international institutions. Both the U.S. and Israel should recommit to diplomacy as a weapon of first choice, rather than the last choice, for preventing proliferation. Finally, both countries should bolster the nonproliferation regime by establishing a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone as a one practical step on the road to verified global nuclear disarmament.

India Interdicts Graphite Shipment to Iran

In the last two days, The Times of India had two pieces on Iran worth pointing out.

The first appeared on April 22 exposes a Mumbai firm caught trying to export 1,150 kg of nuclear graphite to Iran, which is illegal under UN Security Council Resolutions because it can be used for dual purposes. Graphite is an important material for the construction of nuclear reactors as it is one of the purest material manufactured at industrial scale and it retains its properties at high temperatures.

The director of Nickunj Eximp Enterprises Pvt Lt, the company caught trying to export the nuclear graphite, Nickunj Shah, claims that he was unaware of the Indian Commerce Ministry’s notification of September 7, 2007 listing goods banned from being exported to Iran. Nickunj Shah also supplies electric discharge machine wires and graphite parts to Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and sells explosive and narcotic detectors to police agencies and army outfits in India.

Indian customs officials followed the trail and the graphite bound for Iran was procured from local dealers. But, It was imported at 50 Rupees per kg (about US$1.25) from China and was being exported to Iran at 2,000 Rupees per kg (about US$50). So, 1,150 kgs at $50 per kg = $57,500 roughly. That’s a pretty big mark-up.

In an editorial on April 23, The Times of India says the seizure is a clear message to the world of where India stands in respect of Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapon capability. The editorial then went on to highlight the hypocrisy of nonproliferation policy in the West. According to the editorial:

“However, India is unable to go along with the US, UK, France and Germany in applying coercion on Iran, without demonstrating that they have done all that is possible to stop proliferation of materials and technologies from their own countries to Iran. After all most of the Iranian enrichment programme was developed with the initial support of Pakistani nuclear scientist A Q Khan and subsequent help from Western European contractors who have been the resource base for Khan's network and earlier for Iraq and South Africa in the apartheid era. Nor has the US been forthcoming in revealing its stakes in Khan during 1975-2003 when it had intervened twice with the Dutch authorities, according to former Dutch prime minister Ruud Lubbers, to let the arrested Khan go free. ”Surely Iran cannot sustain its uranium enrichment programme without continuing support from the European industry.

“There has so far been no transparency on the past and present proliferation of Western European firms and action undertaken by states concerned to stop that proliferation. Such transparency will be a major step in slowing down and halting Iranian and other proliferation. Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has testified to increasing cooperation by Iran with the IAEA but not yet given Iran a clean chit. At the same time he has expressed his disagreement with coercive measures directed against Iran. The western approach of holding only the recipient of the nuclear weapon technology responsible while being permissive of suppliers' activities is not only unfair but has so far proved counterproductive. ”India should support the IAEA and advise Iran to abide by international obligations it voluntarily accepted. It should, at the same time, oppose military coercion to stop proliferation. It would be a mistake on the part of the West to present a binary choice of military action against Iran or a nuclear Iran. India is already living with two nuclear neighbours, one of which constantly asserts that its weapons are India-specific. The most effective way of halting Iranian nuclear weapon proliferation is tightening up the controls over European nuclear industries and doing it transparently, while enlisting the cooperation of Russia and China in this effort.”

I admire that The Times of India somewhat taunts Iran “to abide by international obligations it voluntarily accepted.” At least it isn’t hypocritical since India has nuclear weapons but refuses to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I couldn’t agree with the editorial more on the issue of a false binary choice between military action or a nuclear Iran. I would only add what IAEA Director Mohammed ElBaradei has said many times, nonproliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin. If the nuclear weapons states, and the world for that matter, are serious about preventing proliferation, then they better get serious about disarmament as well.

ISIS Publishes IAEA Nuclear Briefing Notes

The Institute for Science and International Security published notes today from a briefing given in Vienna by Olli Heinonen, the IAEA's Deputy Director General of Safeguards in February 2008 to member states, including Iran.

According to ISIS, the notes were prepared by one of the diplomats attending the briefing and checked among a other delegations. The IAEA has not reviewed these notes and has not supported their dissemination. As a result, they represent an unofficial record of the meeting and may contain inaccuracies. ISIS describes the contents of the notes as follows:

"The notes describe the technical basis for the IAEA's outstanding questions about the scope and direction of Iran's alleged nuclear weaponization studies. Specifically, it describes some of the information contained on a laptop obtained in Iran by an intelligence operation in 2004, as well as additional information provided by IAEA member states to the IAEA more recently. The information presented, which included multimedia files, describes several aspects of what could be nuclear weapons development-instructions on how to communicate internally using first names only, missile re-entry vehicle research including the chronology of events-separation of the missile, loss-of-tracking, switching on of altitude detectors, timing of firing devices-leading to an explosion at an altitude of about 600 meters. The IAEA notes that the altitude described in the documents excludes the possibility that the warhead was designed to accommodate conventional explosives or chemical and biological charges.

The briefing notes also summarize the reactions of Iranian diplomats at the meeting. They insist repeatedly that the allegations are groundless and the documents fabricated."

Click here to read the notes.

Iran Celebrates National Nuclear Day; Experts Address Iran’s Nuclear Program

Although there was no yellow cake for dessert, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad marked Iran’s National Nuclear Technology Day by announcing that his country has made major progress on their nuclear program. President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran has started installation of some 6,000 new centrifuges and testing a new type of centrifuge that works five times faster. However, claims of progress on the nuclear program have been exaggerated in the past and Iran has had trouble operating the 3,000 centrifuges already in place. President Ahmadinejad's claims of a more advanced centrifuge appear to allude to the IR-2 centrifuge, which Iran announced to the IAEA in January.

Meanwhile, back in the U.S., the National Iranian American Council held a conference on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC that included a panel on the Iranian nuclear issue featuring Dr. Hans Blix, Ambassador Thomas Pickering and David Albright. Yellow cake wasn’t served there either.

Hans Blix said Iran’s nuclear program has led to increased tension in the region. He agrees that the U.S. should hold direct talks with Iran and said it was “curious” to ask Iran to suspend enrichment before entering into talks. Dr. Blix commented that it seems humiliating to make such a precondition and he can see why Iran has not done so. He also pointed out that no deal proposed to Iran has included security guarantees.

Dr. Blix put forward the idea of a Fuel Cycle Free Zone in the Middle East as a first step towards a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. He also noted the challenges posed by guaranteeing fuel assurances. He underscored the need for Iran to adopt the Additional Protocol.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering explained the ideas behind the recent proposal he put forward along with Ambassador Bill Leurs and Jim Walsh for a multilateral enrichment facility in Iran. Behind their proposal is an underlying belief that the perfect can become the enemy of the good and we are quickly running out of time to resolve the political standoff over the nuclear issue.

In terms of moving forward, Ambassador Pickering said the U.S. should open talks with Iran without preconditions and any or every subject should be put on the table. He noted that the multilateral enrichment facility should be for civilian uses only, that it should based on Iranian technology, but there should be no stockpiling of fuel and no research conducted outside of the confines of the facility. Finally, he noted that Iran can build centrifuges faster than the West can exert pressure. He said that a multilateral enrichment facility could allow for engagement with Iran and allow for wide-range inspection to restore confidence in Iran’s intentions.

David Albright’s began his talk by saying, “unfortunately Iran is never interested in proposals,” followed by “they are moving forward with a nuclear weapons program.”

There have certainly been a number of proposals and counter-proposals between the Europeans and Iranians with many areas of commonality. In past proposals both in European negotiations and the 2003 offer to the United States, Iran has offered: “a ceiling on enrichment” to keep it at low levels;” “approval of the Additional Protocol;” “additional confidence-building measures including on-site, continuous presence of IAEA inspectors;” “commencement of the work at the Isfahan plant at low-capacity and full-scope monitoring;” “presentation of legislation on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Techonology, including Permanent Ban on Production, Stockpiling and Use of Nuclear Weapons to Majlis;” reaffirmation of commitment “to all relevant international instruments on the elimination and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction;” and a reaffirmation of commitment “not to pursue nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction under any circumstance.” And these are just the offers on the nuclear program. Iran has also put forward offers to cooperate on nonproliferation; to cooperate on anti-terrorism; to support regional security arrangements; to adopt export controls; to cooperate on drug trafficking; recognition of the state of Israel and stopping support for anti-Israel terrorists. I would also consider Iran’s August 2007 Modality Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency a proposal that Iran accepted and fulfilled.

Ambassador Pickering put it most aptly when he said there is a saying in diplomacy, “when you’re in a deep hole, you should stop digging.” The U.S. is in a deep hole in regards to Iran. Despite many opportunities since September 11, 2001 to get out of the hole, it has only gotten deeper over the past seven years because of the failure of the U.S. to drop preconditions for negotiations, failure to approach Iran on the nuclear and other issues with respect, failure to offer Iran security guarantees, and failure to take regime change off the table.

The U.S. will never get out of the hole with Iran unless it takes a more comprehensive approach. A major deficit for U.S. policy is lack of expertise on Iran, its psychology and history in policy circles. Rhetorically, Iran certainly does not help itself. But the question posed today is how do we break the political stalemate. There simply can not be forward progress on the nuclear program, in Iraq or on other issues without courageous U.S. diplomatic leadership to engage Iran in sustained, direct negotiations.

Iran to Announce Progress on National Day of Nuclear Technology

According to the Tehran Times, Iranian government spokesman Gholam-Hossein Elham told reporters in a news conference that the country will announce progress on the nuclear program on April 8, Iran's national day of nuclear technology, which coincides with the break of official relations between Iran and the United States in 1979. On April 4, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rejected any new package of incentives from the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council and Germany in exchange for suspending enrichment.

At the same news conference, Elham strongly dismissed reports that the Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is in Iran. However, Associated Press correspondent Ali Akbar Dareini writes that an Iranian governtment official who deals with Iraq confirmed on April 5 that his government helped end the clashes between Iraqi government troops and al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia for the sake of Shiite unity. An Iraqi official also confirmed Iran's role saying, "Iran played a mediating role and helped ease things a lot. Given its influence over al-Sadr, Iran convinced the Sadrists to stop fighting."

Despite Evidence, CIA Director Says Iran Still Pursuing Nuclear Weapon

Despite evidence available to him from 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, not to mention international experts, CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said Sunday that he believes Iran is still pursuing a nuclear weapon.

Appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press," he was asked whether he thought Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapon. Hayden’s response was, "Yes," and added that his assessment was not based on "court-of-law stuff. . . . This is Mike Hayden looking at the body of evidence."

According to a Los Angeles Times article:

“He said his conviction stemmed largely from Iran's willingness to endure international sanctions rather than comply with demands for nuclear inspections and abandon its efforts to develop technologies that can produce fissile material.

“’Why would the Iranians be willing to pay the international tariff they appear willing to pay for what they're doing now if they did not have, at a minimum . . . the desire to keep the option open to develop a nuclear weapon and, perhaps even more so, that they've already decided to do that?’ he said.”

Apparently Hayden’s “body of evidence” doesn’t include any of Iran’s history, otherwise he would know that Iranians will not back down from threats, even at the price of sanctions and isolation. As Professor Ruhi Ramazani argues, psychological and political factors are more important. In his eloquent op-ed, “Sanctions on Iran: Will they work?,” which I have referred to repeatedly, Professor Ramazani writes: “Historically, Iranian national sentiment soars in the face of foreign pressure…In reaction to foreign coercion, the Iranian sense of national unity overcomes factional strife. It is a transcendental force inspired by a powerful belief of the Iranian people that their national identity is rooted in the continuity and resilience of their culture and civilization despite over two millennia of foreign pressures and invasions, from Alexander of Macedonia to Saddam of Iraq.”

I have made this comparison before, but I believe there are a number of similarities between Iran's experience to nationalize its oil and the current standoff over the nuclear program. In the struggle to nationalize oil, Britain conducted a vigorous sanctions campaign and moved carriers into the Persian Gulf to threaten Iran. But there were those in Britain, like Earl Mountbatten who "told his superiors in the Admirality that instead of listening to the 'notoriously bellicose' Herbert Morrison's advice on how to 'cow these insolent natives,' Britain should realize 'economic and military threats could only make things worse.'"

I firmly believe Iran’s nuclear program has everything to do with pride and prestige. For Iran, the nuclear issue also has everything to do with the country’s sense of justice and victimization. The issue of prestige was even raised in the most recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, “…opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways might — if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program.” But Hayden’s “body of evidence” probably doesn’t include that finding either.

I believe Iran wants to be like a Japan, which has its own indigenous fuel cycle capability and enough nuclear material to produce about 2,000 nuclear weapons if it ever made the political decision to do so. While there are certainly hardliners in Iran who would like to see a nuclear weapons program, the regime is not stupid. They know that if they develop a nuclear weapon, it will immediately trigger regional proliferation and Iran will lose its conventional military superiority.

A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff?

(Pictured here: the Natanz nuclear facility and surrounding air defense. The facility is actually nowhere near the village of Natanz, but closer to Kashan.)




Just before leaving for Iran, I noted that the New York Review of Books would be publishing a new article entitled "A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff" by William Leurs, Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Jim Walsh (a member of the Center's board of directors). The authors propose "that Iran's efforts to produce enriched uranium and other related nuclear activities be conducted on a multilateral basis, that is to say jointly managed and operated on Iranian soil by a consortium including Iran and other governments. This proposal provides a realistic, workable solution to the US–Iranian nuclear standoff. Turning Iran's sensitive nuclear activities into a multinational program will reduce the risk of proliferation and create the basis for a broader discussion not only of our disagreements but of our common interests as well."

Indeed it is a proposal that has been in the works for quite some time. The authors have spent a considerable amount of time working on such a workable proposal with Iranian counterparts.

During the conference on "Iran's Peaceful Nuclear Program and Activities: Modality of Cooperation with the IAEA" sponsored by the Institute for Political and International Studies on March 9 in Tehran, Jonathan Granoff, the only American on the general plenary panel, presented the Leurs/Pickering/Walsh multilateral enrichment consortium idea. However, the official response to Jonathan's mention of the proposal was:
1. "There was a number of sections where Iran's rights were not taken into account." 2. "We see a consortium as a precondition and it is not acceptable."3. "We already suspended for two years and there was no forward progress."4. "This is asking Iran to do more and it is not fair. This proposal is completely unacceptable to us."

In his speech to the conference, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said that the recent report from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohammed ElBaradei shows that all of the ambiguities about Iran's nuclear program no longer exist. He said is Iran is not asking for more than its rights entitled to it under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and they will not back down from military threats or threats of regime change. According to Mottaki, “Iran's nuclear program has everything to do with fair play and double standards are a serious blow and threat to the NPT.” He also said Iran made a goodwill gesture in cooperating with the IAEA on the August 2007 Modality and in answering all the questions agreed to in it.

Mottaki concluded that Iran will not stop its nuclear program, nor does it have any reason to because their activities are legal under the NPT. He said although the Modality Agreement has come to an end, Iran will continue cooperation with the IAEA under the confines of the NPT. However, he and others at the conference seemed to suggest that Iran's negotiations on the nuclear program would be limited to the IAEA alone, at least for the time being. Furthermore, he said, “Iran has always welcomed targeted negotiations that follow a plan. The Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to talk on all issues, but from now on, all proposals must be targeted, including ongoing issues around the world.”

Deputy Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Mr. Vaeedi took an even harsher stance at the conference. In his opinion, “the story is not a nuclear story to begin with.” He said “Iran is no longer willing to engage in an illogical process that ignores the experience of the past.” While he noted that Iran will continue to cooperate with the IAEA, he reaffirmed that Iran will continue its nuclear activities.

The speeches and the response to the Leurs/Pickering/Walsh proposal at the conference reflect a hardening of Iran's official public position on the nuclear issue, particularly following the new round recently passed Security Council sanctions on Iran. It further demonstrates that we really have come to a political standoff on the nuclear issue and threats of sanctions and military action will only make it even more difficult to resolve.

IAEA Report, etc

This is one last post before I leave to visit the country that is the subject of this blog. I am hoping I will have access to my blog while there and be able to report on my experiences. If not, I will certainly post a report upon my return to the U.S. in mid-March.

The much awaited report from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammed ElBaradei was published yesterday. It really came as no suprise that on the one had, the report noted Iranian cooperation to resolve outstanding questions agreed to in the August 2007 work plan. According to the report: "[The] Agency considers those questions no longer outstanding at this stage."

On the other hand, the report notes:

"The one major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. This is a matter of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear programme. The Agency was able to show some relevant documentation to Iran on 3–5 February 2008 and is still examining the allegations made and the statements provided by Iran in response." Iran's response has been that the evidence is fabricated and the accusations baseless.

Another welcome development is that "The Agency has recently received from Iran additional information similar to that which Iran had previously provided pursuant to the Additional Protocol, as well as updated design information. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current declared nuclear programme has become clearer." The report notes, "However, this information has been provided on an ad hoc basis and not in a consistent and complete manner. The Director General has continued to urge Iran to implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date and as an important confidence building measure requested by the Board of Governors and affirmed by the Security Council."

The report also finds that "Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of [the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant] PFEP and [Fuel Enrichment Plant] FEP. In addition, Iran started the development of new generation centrifuges. Iran has also continued construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant."

The report concludes:

With regard to its current programme, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about its scope and nature. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. With the exception of the issue of the alleged studies, which remains outstanding, the Agency has no concrete information about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although Iran has provided some additional detailed information about its current activities on an ad hoc basis, the Agency will not be in a position to make progress towards providing credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran before reaching some clarity about the nature of the alleged studies, and without implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of the many years of undeclared activities in Iran and the confidence deficit created as a result. The Director General therefore urges Iran to implement all necessary measures called for by the Board of Governors and the Security Council to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme."

Here is an interview entitled "IAEA Report: Beginning of the End?" with Iran representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh and myself on the release of the report.

Also, yesterday, the Seattle Post-Intellingencer published an editorial entitled "Are we on the brink of war? Reasons to worry" by D. Parvaz.

Be sure to check the New York Review of Books on Monday. It will feature an article by two retired senior diplomats, William Luers and Thomas Pickering, and a research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Jim Walsh (also on the Center's Board of Directors). The article urges the United States to use the intelligence report as a reason to open unconditional talks with Iran, and ultimately to establish an international fuel-production facility on its soil.

Iran's Centrifuge Progress Underscores Need for U.S. to Drop Preconditions

News reports that Iran is progressing in efforts to make more efficient and reliable centrifuges underscore the need for the U.S. to drop preconditions and begin negotiating with Iran immediately. European diplomats and American officials disclosed this week that Iran is testing new centrifuges known as IR-2s. The existence of the IR-2s were revealed in January when International Atomic Energy Agency officials were allowed to visit a complex for the machine’s development.

The IR-2s are a modified version of the P-2 centrifuge (P meaning Pakistani in origin). According to a new report by David Albright and Jaqueline Shire at the Institute for Science and International Security, a tubelike rotor made of carbon fibers rather than maraging steel is at the core of the new centrifuge design, demonstrating considerable technical creativity.

IR-2s are meant to replace the less reliable P-1 centrifuges, of which Iran currently is operating about 3,000 at 10 percent capacity at the Natanz nuclear facility. According to Albright and Shire, the IR-2 uranium enrichment throughput is about 2.5 times greater than the P-1 centrifuge, which means that if configured properly, it would take approximately 1,200 IR-2 centrifuges versus 3,000 P-1 centrifuges to produce a similar quantity of enriched uranium.

The U.S. is using the opportunity to make the case for a third round of United Nations sanctions against Iran ahead of a new report to be delivered later this month by IAEA Director Mohammed ElBaradei on progress to resolve outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear program. The new draft resolution already agreed to by the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and U.S.) is mostly an incremental increase in sanctions, including a provision that would require countries to deny entry to any person involved in Iran's nuclear programs, it also goes beyond previous resolutions to include a ban on all trade in civilian nuclear equipment or technology that could also be used to create nuclear weapons. The U.S. also wants UN member states to be asked to inspect cargo going to and from Iran if there is reason to believe that contraband is aboard – a measure that raises the danger of further incidents at sea between U.S. and Iranian warships in the already tense Persian Gulf.

Iran is not relenting to existing UN sanctions and is unlikely to relent under a new round of sanctions. Progress on a new generation of centrifuges highlights the need for the U.S. to drop preconditions and engage in direct, unconditional, bilateral talks with Iran to resolve outstanding issues. Such a move would provide incentive for Iran to implement the Additional Protocol, which was reaffirmed by the IAEA delegation in January, so that Iran’s nuclear program will become more transparent and accountable to inspectors and the international community.

As side note related to the Additional Protocol, President George W. Bush took a surprising step on February 4 when he issued an executive order directing U.S. agencies to develop regulations to administer the Additional Protocol to the U.S. safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is still unclear when the President will submit formal notification, but once finalized the Additional Protocol would grant IAEA officials access to civilian nuclear facilities, though not access to nuclear weapons facilities. The move may have been prompted to partially allay concerns about the hypocrisy of U.S. nonproliferation policy which urges Iran and other countries to adopt far more intrusive versions of the Additional Protocol. The move may also be meant to bolster support for U.S. efforts to expand civilian nuclear technology under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and to bolster efforts to carve an exception that would allow the U.S. to cooperate with India, a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on nuclear technology.